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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this paper is to study the character
istics and purposes of neutralization in international
relations, and to propose neutralization of Israel as a
way of removing the big powers from the Middle East
conflict and of guaranteeing Israelis existence.
Historical examples of neutralization are analyzed
to show the actions taken by neutralized nations and by
the external nations which imposed the neutral status
upon them. These actions consist of both those required
initially to establish neutralization and others taken
later to maintain it.
Neutralization is also analyzed as a device for
accomplishing objectives, to determine what purposes it
serves and what effects other than those intended it may
have on both the neutralized nations and on the inter
national system.
The historical examples are seen to vary too greatly
for construction of a general model which could then be
applied to Israel. Instead, the features of the Middle
East problem and of the involvement of the big powers
there are described, and relevant lessons learned from
other cases are used to create a special application
which would fit these features. The proposal, includes
terms of a neutralization treaty.
It is recognized that a simple neutralization of
Israel would be one-sided. The alternative of application
to a larger Middle East area is considered and rejected;
but some supplementary restrictions on Israel1s Arab
neighbors are found to be necessary to make the proposal
acceptable to Israel and the United States.
The proposed application would not settle the conflicts
between Israel and the Arabs, nor between the Cold War
powers; but it is suggested that it would provide some
stability In the Middle East once the local issues are
settled by separate agreement, and that it would also
contribute to maintaining a balance of power between
the Cold War powers.
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NEUTRALIZATION AND
A PROPOSED APPLICATION TO ISRAEL

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

This paper is an exploration of neutralization and
its use in International politics, with a proposal for its
application to the current critical conflict in the Middle
East.

Neutralization has been used with varying degrees

of success in the past.

Its most frequent use was in

Europe during the nineteenth century when it was Included
in various treaties in order to remove certain small nations
from the arena of conflict between the great powers,
However, neutralization agreements were violated during
both World Wars to such an extent that there has been
little Interest in restoring them or initiating new ones
until recently.

Neutralization has been revived In recent

years and applied in Austria and Laos.

Switzerland continues

a neutralized status which was established over a century
ago.

These three are the only examples of nations where

neutralization is now in effect, although there are other
recent cases in which neutralization has been or is being
considered and areas where some features of neutralization
are in effect.
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In this paper I will review the theory of
neutralization, with particular emphasis on those aspects
which might be applied in Israel.

Then, in the final

chapter, I will draw some conclusions as to how a
neutralized status might be established and maintained in
Israel, what purposes It might serve, and what results
might come from it.

\

4

NEUTRALIZATION d e f i n e d

Neutralization was defined by Gyrus Wicker as “the
imposition by International agreement of a condition of
permanent neutrality upon lands or waterways”.
Peter l&on defined it as “the Institution of a status of
permanent neutrality".

2

These definitions are typical of

the commonly accepted meaning of neutralization, and
consequently will be accepted by me for the purposes of
this paper.

However, they do require some clarification

to explain what Is meant by “neutrailty“ and to resolve
a possible ambiguity.
Neutrality, as used in the definition of
neutralization, means that the neutral state does not
participate in any hostile action or international engagement
3
involving hostilities with another state.
In this paper,
I frequently use the terras “neutral11 and “neutrality“, when
IIneutralist11 and “neutralism’1 would be more proper.

The

^Cyrus French Wicker, Neutralization (London: Oxford
.Press, 1911 ), p. 1.
^Peter Lyon, Neutralism (London: Leicester University,
1963), P. 91. Also, Peter Lyon, “Neutrality,
Neutralism, Non-alighment“, International Relations,
Oct. 1968 , 0 . 448.
3h . Lauterpacht, International Law, A Treatise,
L. Oppenhelra, 8 th Ed. (London: Longmans, Green, 1954)
Vol. II, p. 244.

two latter terms refer to not taking sides in the Cold War
rivalry between the major powers.

During the Cold War,

neutralized nations have been expected to avoid such align
ment and therefore to be neutralist as well as neutral.
The■'■"imposition11 of neutrality implies positive actions
taken by powers external to the nation being neutralized.
They must recognize or guarantee the status of neutrality.
Yet, neutrality is commonly perceived also as a policy or
actions taken by the “neutral" nation itself.

Neutralization

therefore implies actions taken by the neutralized nation
as well as by the external powers.

There is thus an

apparent ambiguity concerning the question of. whether
neutralization is self-imposed or imposed from without.
Both of these aspects discussed above will be covered in
detail in this paper, and they will be referred to as the
“external" and "internal" aspects.
We can consider both Austria and nineteenth-century
Belgium as examples of neutralization, although formal action
to impose neutralization on Austria has been Incomplete, and
Belgium did not assume the obligations of a neutralized
nation.

Wicker resolved this matter in 1911 by stating

that there are two types of neutralization.

However, recent

developments have shown that a single definition which
includes both of these aspects is more useful.

For example,

Brierly states that a neutralized state is "one whose integrity

has been permanently guaranteed by international treaty,
conditional on its maintaining perpetual neutrality save
4
in its own defense11.
On this basis, some authorities
claim that Austria is not a true example of neutralization.^
For purposes of this paper, I will include such border-line
cases.

These and other cases fall along a range from

extremes of self-imposed neutrality with international
recognition at one extreme, to externally imposed neutrality
at the other extreme.
these extremes.

In reality, all cases fall between

Even Austria and Belgium contain some

elements of both aspects, and both must be kept in mind in
considering application in Israel.

The external aspect

concerns such questions as whether the United States and the
Soviet Union could agree to end the Middle East arms race
and how each of them, as well as the Arab nations, could be
prevented from interfering with Israeli affairs.

The

internal aspect concerns such questions as whether Israel
would accept a neutral position and whether it could defend
its own neutrality and independence.
Neutralization cannot be described adequately by brief
definitions.

Chapter Two of this paper will expand them to

show in detail the external and Internal requirements
necessary to the status of neutralization.

There Is no

^James L. Brierly, Law of Nations. 2 nd Ed. (Oxford,
1936), p. 95> as quoted in Fred Greene, ^Neutralization
and The Balance of Power*1, American Political Science
Review, Dec. 1953, PP. 1041-1042.
<5Lyon. “Neutrality, Neutralism, Non-alignment",
pp. 448-449.
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11typical” example, and each case has Its special

characteristics.

Nevertheless, an attempt will be made to

build a model of neutralization which would fit Israel,
Studies of neutralization vary in that some see
neutrality as a astatusH and others as a “processw.

As a

status, it is permanent neutrality guaranteed by a treaty.
In this context, it might be a goal for negotiators.

It is

considered as an end rather than a means toward some other
end.

This concept is most useful for students of international

law.
Equally useful, however, is the concept of neutralization
as a process or device to be used to achieve other ends.

For

example, Lyon calls it a "device by which great powers...
endeavor to remove small but strategically important
territories outside the active sphere of international
rivalries11.^

Once the external powers sign their treaty and

the neutralized state announces its neutral intentions, what
changes will thereby be brought about in the nations con
cerned and in the international system?

Neutralization may

mean a step toward international peace and stability or it
may not.

Chapter Three will analyze the purposes behind

neutralization, assess its success, and bring out other
incidental results.

These objectives and results of

neutralization will then be re-examined in Chapter Four in
light of the present situation in the Middle East.

^I^ron, Neutralism, p. 91
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HISTORICAL EXAMPLES

The concept of neutralization can be understood best
by examining cases where it has been employed.

A brief

explanation of its applications in Switzerland, Belgium,
Luxembourg, Laos, and Austria follows.

Further detail

on these examples will be added in subsequent chapters.
Switzerland' is the classic example of neutralization.
It was the first nation to be neutralized by international
convention, in 1815, and remains neutralized today.

Before

this convention, Switzerland had been following a selfimposed policy of neutrality for over a century with respect
to the wars between the European states, but without external
recognition of that policy.

Switzerland was unable to retain

its neutrality when invaded by Napoleon, but after his defeat
that status was imposed by a neutralization agreement
Included in the Congress of Vienna and the Act of Paris,
both in 1815•
neutral status.

The Swiss government agreed to abide by the
The obligations of Switzerland and of the

neutralizing powers were vague in many respects, but the
7

Lauterpacht, Vol.II, pp. 245—246.
Lyon, Neutrailsmt p. 154.
Wicker, pp. 14-20.
Cyril E. Black et al., Neutralization And World
Politics, (Princeton, N.J., Princeton Univ.Press,
1968), PP. 24-27.

agreement survived, anyway.

Switzerland, became an important

part of the balance of power system in Europe, and. Swiss
neutrality succeeded, by virtue of those actions of European
nations to maintain the balance of power as well as by
deliberate actions of Switzerland and its neighbors to
enforce it.

Switzerland insisted on using its own military

and diplomatic resources to enforce its neutrality.
Switzerland was given special status by the League of Nations
and has not Joined the United Nations.

It does not want to

be committed to use force against another nation in what it
sees as a violation of Its neutral status.
8

Belgium

was neutralized after breaking away from the

Netherlands in 1830.

As a relatively small nation, Belgium

had little chance of survival in the European rivalries of
that time.

It served as a buffer against renewal of French

expansion to the east, and neutralization was a device to
insure that an Independent Belgium would continue to be a
buffer.

The neutralization agreement was drawn up by the

major European powers in 1831, and a series of treaties was
finally concluded in 1839 when Belgium achieved its full
independence.

Belgium agreed to neutralization in return

for its independence, but did not agree to carry out any
obligations to maintain its neutrality.

This status

^Lauterpacht, Vol.II, pp. 246-247.
Black, pp. 24-27.
G-reene, pp. 1046-1048.
William E. Llngelbach, “Belgian Neutrality: Its Origin
And Interpretation1*, American Historical Review,
Oct. 1933, PP- 48-72.
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continued until World War I, when German forces invaded
Belgium,

After that war, the Treaty of Versailles declared

Belgian neutralization to be ended, at the request of
Belgium.

Belgian neutralization was characterized throughout

its history by disagreement between Britain, France, and
Prussia, over what they should do to restore Belgian
neutrality if one of them should violate it.
9
Neutralization of Luxembourg took place under similar
circumstances.

It too was a buffer between France and

Germany, and was neutralized upon gaining its independence
from the Netherlands in I867 .

It had been a part of the

Germanic federation even under Dutch rule when its fortresses
had been armed by Prussia.

When Napoleon III tried to pur

chase it from Prussia, other nations of Europe with interests
in Luxembourg joined with France and Prussia to neutralize It,
avoiding a contest over its control.

The tiny nation was

also demilitarized and therefore could take no military
actions to protect its neutral status.

Although overrun by

Germany In both World Wars, it continued to claim a neutralized
status until 1948 when It Joined the Brussels Treaty, the
first of several mutual security pacts with its neighbors.
The neutralization of Laos'*’0 in 1962 stopped
dangerously increasing competition between the United States
and the Soviet Union over control of that nation.

Laos had

^Lauterpacht, Vol.II, p. 244.
Black, pp. 24-2?•
lOBlack, pp. 29-31*
Arthur J. Domiaen, Conflict In Laos, (New York:
Praeger, 1964), pp. 200-303*

been given Independence from France In 1954, but a combination
of communist forces tried to take control of the country.
These forces received strong support, including arms, from
the Soviet Union, while the United States was supplying
arms to the Laotian government.

This competition was

approaching open conflict between the two powers, although
Laos was not important enough to either of them to go to war.
President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev agreed during
informal talks in Vienna in 1961 to neutralize Laos in order
to avoid war without either yielding to the other.

A

fourteen-nation convention met at Geneva in 1962 to neutralize
Laos.

The International Control Commission, already estab

lished by the Geneva Convention of 1954 on Indo-Chlna, was
assigned the added function of observing the neutralization
of Laos*

Violations were to be handled by Britain and the

Soviet Union, co-chairmen of the 1954 convention, who would
reconvene that body to decide on appropriate action.
The neutralization agreement succeeded in preventing
the imminent hostilities between the Soviet Union and the
United States.

However, it has never really accomplished

the neutralization of Laos.

Foreign troops have not been

removed from Laotian territory, as required by the agreement.
The International Control Commission often has not been
permitted access to areas where violations were taking place,
and the members of the commission have been unable to agree
in interpreting their observations as to what constitutes a

12
violation.

As explained later, this disagreement was a

reflection of the Cold War since the commission consisted
of members sympathetic to each side.
South Vietnam continues to support, with its military
forces, the overthrow of the government of Laos, and to use
Laotian territory for transportation of troops and supplies
into South Vietnam,

The United States, called in at the

request of the government of Laos to observe violations,
was eventually engaged in military operations in Laos both
to protect its observation aircraft and to block the flow
of North Vietnamese troops and supplies through Laos.

With

United States air support, South Vietnam invaded Laos in
1971*

The Soviet Union and China provide military supplies

to support North Vietnamese military operations in Laos.
A further complication in Laos comes from the internal
political situation there.

Before Laos could be neutralized,

it was necessary to establish a Laotian government which would
adopt a policy of neutrality.

This was achieved when the

three major contending factions Joined to form a coalition
government and chose as Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma who
has attempted to follow a neutral policy.

The coalition

government has not been effective, and the Prime Minister
has not been able to achieve any control over nearly half
of the country which is under communist Pathet Lao and North
Vietnamese control.

it is clear that Laos has never been

•tv''
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neutralized in fact, although legally the agreement still
stands.
The most recent case of neutralization in Europe is
Austria.^

In 195^ Austria and Germany were still under

occupation forces left over from World War'll.

These forces

were being supplied by the Soviet Union, the United States,
Prance and Britain.

The Soviet Union and the other three

powers had been unable to agree on peace treaties for those
nations.

In 1955 Mr. Molotov, the Soviet Foreign Minister,

proposed that each of the two occupied countries be
neutralized and united, thereby removing Western and Soviet
military forces.

At first, the Western nations did not

respond, believing that the Soviet proposal would prevent
Germany and Austria from Joining NATO.

They also saw this

proposal as a stratagem of the Soviet Union by which Germany
and Austria would be taken under communist control following
the examples of the eastern European nations.

Austria

agreed, in hopes that it would thereby be freed of all
occupation forces and regain its independence.
declared its permanent neutrality.

Austria

The Soviet Union there

upon signed a peace treaty with Austria, removed its troops,
and agreed to participate in a four-power guarantee of
Austrian neutrality.

The other three occupation powers

11Blaoic, pp. 27-29.

Lyon, Neutralism, 'pp.■164-176.
Alfred Verdoss, “Austria^ Permanent Neutrality and
the United Nations Organization1*. American Journal
of International Law, 1956 , pp. 61-68 and editorial
comment by J.L.Kunz, pp. 418-425*
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agreed only to the extent of informing Austria that they
recognize its neutrality, but they have not made any
commitment to guarantee that status.

Subsequently, those

four nations have respected Austrian neutralization.

Most

other nations of the world have followed suit by informing
Austria of their intentions to observe Its neutrality.
Austria continues to have that status today.
There have been a number of other examples with some
features of neutralization.

Cracow, a city state, was

neutralized in 1815 by Austria, Prussia and Russia.

One

term of the treaty closed the city to refugees, giving
Austria and Russia Justification to invade it in 1846, when
Cracow refused to return political refugees.
it was annexed by Austria.

Soon after,

12

A case of neutrality imposed by a single external
nation is Finland, neutralized by the Soviet Union in 1948.
The Soviet Union agreed by treaty to permit and defend
Finland^ independence, and Finland agreed to remain outside
the conflict of interests of the great powers.

This was to

Include resistance by Finland against Germany or any German
ally attempting to invade the Soviet Union through Finland.
There was no recognition of Finland*s neutrality by other
13
major nations. Finland has maintained its independence and
neutrality, but has occasionally been subjected to some
pressure from the Soviet Union to cooperate in Soviet defense

^Wicker, pp. 20-23.
^I^ron, Neutralism, p. 97*
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and to form governments acceptable to the Soviet Union.
One could also include cases of imposed neutrality
involving areas at sea, the Antarctic, and neutral zones
within or between countries, although they do not provide
for independence of the neutral territory.
These examples and precedents might suggest ways by
which the problem of Israel can be solved.

That problem

Is explained in detail in the last chapter.
Briefly, Israel has become a focus of conflict between
the big powers.

Britain and France were directly involved

in Israel and the Middle East when they colonized the area,
and were engaged In warfare there as recently as 195 & when
they participated in the Israeli invasion of Egypt.

Britain

and France are less involved there now than they were, but
the United States and the Soviet Union have now developed
a serious rivalry in the Middle East which could result In
warfare between them.

Isreal*s very existence is threatened

by hostile neighbors.

Therefore, Israel can be considered

another candidate for neutralization, to be removed like
Laos or Austria from the arena of Cold War conflict, and
protected by international guarantees.

CHAPTER II
NEUTRALIZATION AS A STATUS

In this chapter, neutralization will be discussed
as a status, and in the next, as a process*

The Inquiry

Into neutralization as a status will begin with an
investigation of the elements needed to establish that
status, followed by those, elements needed to maintain it.
These elements will be illustrated by historical examples.

16
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PARTICIPATING NATIONS

In establishing the neutralization of a nation,
actions are normally taken by both the nation to be
neutralized and the external nations which are agreeing to
neutralize It.

How many nations should be included and

which nations should they be?

Many such external nations

may be Involved in these actions, and the neutralization
of Laos provides a good example of many nations participating
for a variety of reasons.
The agreement for Laos was proposed by the two major
powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, in order to
avoid their Increased and dangerous Involvement there.
Twelve other nations (including Laos, itself) Joined in the
negotiations, and the agreement was complete when all of
them had concurred.

The United Kingdom participated as a

major power with general Interests in the area, but the
United Kingdom and the Soviet Union were also obligated to
participate because their foreign secretaries had been cochairmen of the Geneva Convention of 195^ and retained
responsibilities of supervising the implementation of that
treaty.

France, although distant, had strong national
Interests there which had continued since the days when
Laos was a French colony.

India, Canada and Poland had

obligations to provide members for an International Control
Commission to observe violations of the Geneva Convention
of 195** •

Cambodia, South Vietnam, North Vietnam and Thailand

were included as close neighbors whose national security was
affected by conditions In Laos.

Cambodia was particularly

Interested in preserving its own neutral status.

The fact

that neighboring North Vietnam and South Vietnam were engaged
in war meant that neutralization of Laos would have to
include attention by those nations to keep the war out of
Laos.

North Vietnam had troops fighting in Laos which would

have to be withdrawn.

Communist China completes the roster

of participants, joining because of strong interests there
and a desire to remove foreign powers from an area which It
considers to be within its sphere of Influence.

China shares

a border with Laos and is therefore a constant threat to Laos.
It is not always necessary for so many nations to
participate.

Most other cases have Involved only a few

nations in formal negotiations, although subsequently others
may have given formal or informal recognition of the agreement.
For example, Austrian neutralization came about through a
series of agreements between Austria and the four powers
with occupation forces there.

Other nations later recognized

19
Austria's permanent neutrality, and by 1968 the number
Xk
had reached sixty-two nations.
Nineteenth century cases of neutralization were
negotiated by the major powers of Europe, to settle the
rivalries among them.

They were initiated by Great Britain,

France, Austria, Prussia and Russia, the nations which
played the major role in maintaining the European balance
of power.

Additional European nations joined in some cases.

It was those five nations which formally established and
guaranteed Swiss neutrality at Paris in 1815, although Spain,
Portugal ana Holland also had agreed at preliminary
negotiations earlier that year.

Belgian neutralization was

established by those five nations at London in 1831, and the
guarantee was renewed by them with the addition of Holland
In 1839.

Those same five nations, along with Holland,

Luxembourg and Italy neutralized Luxembourg at London in
186?.

Belgium was also represented at the conference but

did not sign the treaty since the obligation to defend
Luxembourg would have been a violation of Belgian neutrality,
as I will explain later.

Luxembourg retained ties with

Holland, sharing a monarch, King William, until 1890.

In

View of this tie, one might question whether Luxembourg was
really neutralized with respect to Holland.

However, the

emphasis was on the major powers and their obligation to

^Austrian People's Party Newspaper, Volksblatt,
according to New York Times. Sept.21, 1963, p. 4.
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refrain from imposing their rule over the neutralized
state.

Relations between relatively small nations and the

neutralized nations were of minor importance.^
In view of this fact, why was it considered necessary
to include so many smaller nations in the Laotian treaty?
The reason was that in the case of Laos, the major powers
did not have the control over the smaller Asian nations
that the five big powers had over the smaller nations in
nineteenth century Europe.

Furthermore, distances to Laos

are much greater than within Europe, and the international
and internal situations more unstable there.

Withdrawal of

the great powers from Laos was likely to leave a power
vacuum into which these other nations might enter.

Violation

of Laotian neutrality would not be so great an upset to the
balance of power between the big powers as an invasion of
Belgium or Switzerland would have been.

All of these

reasons indicate that small nations were much more likely
to destroy the neutrality of Laos than of Belgium,
Luxembourg or Switzerland; and for that reason, they were
included in the neutralization negotiations.
In summary, the participating nations consist of those
which have an interest in or are capable of disrupting
neutralization.

They may be grouped into five categories:

(1 ) the neutralized nation, (2 ) major powers, (3 ) neighbors,
(H) neutrals for enforcing purposes, if necessary, and
(5 ) other minor nations which might have interests there.

^Lauterpacht, Vol. II, pp. 246—2^8.
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The interested minor nations need not always participate
directly in the negotiations; but if they do not, they
should either declare their consent, or be under the control
of other participants who can keep them from disrupting the
situation.
Having determined which nations would participate,
let us see what actions they would take to establish a status
of neutralization.

They must first agree to the neutrality

and then implement the terms of their agreement.

It is most

convenient to examine the actions taken by the erternal
nations first, and then those taken by the nation being
neutralized.

Finally, there are other actions taken Jointly.

This discussion will focus on the initial, measures to be
taken, keeping in mind that other measures needed to maintain
neutralization after it is established will be presented
later.

22

EXTERNAL ACTIONS TO ESTABLISH NEUTRALIZATION

The agreement negotiated by the external nations can
be a formal treaty, or it can be quite informal, as when
officials with authority simply make it known that their
governments intend to respect a nation*s neutrality.
The formal procedure was used in the nineteenth century
cases in Europe.

Although the members of the Congress of

Vienna had already agreed by a declaration to neutralize
Switzerland, they formalized this agreement a few months
later by including it in the Act of Paris.

Similarly, the

neutralization of Belgium was a part of the Treaty of London
of 1831 , and again formalized eight years later at the time
that it was Implemented.

Luxembourg was formally neutralized

according to terms of the Treaty of London of 1867.

Likewise,

the neutralization of Laos in this century came about by the
detailed formal treaty signed at Geneva in 1962 .
An erample of less formality is the accumulation of
statements which neutralized Austria.

Neutrality was imposed

by the Moscow Declaration of April 15, 195'5» which contained
concessions by Austria as conditions to a peace treaty with
the Soviet Union.

The subsequent peace treaty with all four

23
occupation powers contains no references to neutrality.
Neutrality was recognized instead by official statements of
policy from those governments to the government of Austria.
These neutralization agreements vary in their contents
and their degree of detail.

According to definition used in

this paper, the agreement Imposes permanent neutrality.

The

nineteenth century agreements hardly went beyond a general
statement to that effect.

For example,

the agreement for

Switzerland simply declared that the treaty powers recognize
the “formal and authentic acknowledgement of the perpetual
neutrality of Switzerland; and...guarantee that country the
integrity and inviolability of its territory'*.
The terms for Austrian neutralization in the Moscow

Memorandum of April 15, 1955, were likewise brief.
agreement provided:
Switzerland;

That

(l) a neutral Austria on the model of

(2) that the Austrian Parliament would agree

to a status of permanent neutrality for the country;

(3) that

Austria would obtain international recognition of the neutral
status; and (4) that the four occupying powers would be
requested to guarantee the inviolability and Integrity of
Austrian territory.
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American,

British and French state

ments recognizing Austrian neutrality were identical notes
replying to an Austrian request that those nations should

■^J. L. Kunz, “Austria's Permanent Neutrality",
American Journal of International haw, 1956, p. 420.

Zh
recognize its permanent neutrality.

Those notes stated

simply that the government of each of those nations Mhas
taken cognizance of this constitutional law (by which Austria
had declared Its policy of permanent neutrality) and
recognizes the permanent neutrality of Austria as defined
17

therein11.

The Soviet Union also submitted an identical

note, giving the appearance that permanent neutrality was
being initiated by Austria instead of having been imposed
nO

by the Soviet Union.
The American position has been clarified in a memoran
dum on “The Nature of Austria^ Neutrality and Legal
Implication of United States Response to the Neutrality
Declaration11, dated November 16, 1955, by the office of the
Legal Advisor of the Department of State.
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It explained

that the note to Austria meant that the United States was
only declaring that as a matter of policy it would not
violate Austrian neutrality, but was making no commitment
to defend it.
The Declaration of Neutrality of Laos was the most
detailed of all.
17

It contained a list of actions to be met

'Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 19, 1955, P* 1012.
Sven Allard, Russia And The Austrian State Treaty»
.(University Park: Penn State U. Press, 19.70')", p. 225*
*”u. S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
Neutrallza.tlon In Southeast Asia (was hi ng to n :
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1 9 6 6 ), p. 2 3 .

Tby the participating nations.^

The thirteen external

nations agreed:
- to respect the Independence and neutrality of Laos;
- not to act to Impair that Independence and neutrality
to do nothing to threaten that condition;
- not to Interfere in the Internal affairs of Laos;
- to attach no strings to aid given to Laos;
- to engage in no military alliance which would be
inconsistent with the neutrality of Laos;
- not to employ SEATO to protect Laos;
- to remove all foreign troops (with minor exceptions);
- not to use Laotian territory for the purpose of
interfering with other countries;
- not to use the territory of other countries for
the purpose of interfering with Laos.
Each nation appealed to the others to respect Laotian
neutrality and, in case of violation, agreed to consult with
Laos.

A protocol to the agreement added details about such

things as the date of withdrawals, their routes, and means
of enforcement.
Appendix A is a model treaty proposed by four Princeton
University professors engaged by the U. S. Senate Foreign
Relations Committee to make a study of neutralization for

20The Declaration and Protocol on Laos, in Current
History. Oct. 1962, p. 234; also in Black,
pp. 175-184.
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possible application in Southeast Asia.

2i

It is patterned

on the Laos agreement, improved by lessons learned from its
failures.

It can be used, along with historical examples,

as a Bource for a suggested treaty for Israel.

21 Black, pp. 191-195-
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EXTERNAL

actions

to

implement

neutralization

These agreements may be sufficient to establish the
legal basis for neutralization, but they must be followed, up
by

positive actions to implement them.

Whatever acts

prompted the agreement in the first place must be ended.
In all cases of neutralization except Laos,

the

initial implementation of the agreements has posed no
particular problems.
military forces,
nation,

The nations simply removed their

stopped contending over the neutralized

and permitted it to be neutral.

The Laos case is

unique in that some terms of the agreement were never carried
out.

The importance of taking various actions is illustrated

by noting the consequences of violations.

It will be seen

that when neutralization is attempted in an unstable
situation,

enforcement measures may be necessary to insure

initial compliance.

What those enforcement measures might

be will be described later, but the problems necessitating
those measures are explained in the following paragraphs.
At the time of the Laotian agreement, North Vietnamese
troops were present throughout Laos.

22

Some were fighting

^ D o m m e n , pp. 223 ff• provides a detailed account of
the events in Laos which follow.
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with the Pathet Lao against the Royal Laotian government.
Some were occupying Laotian provinces along the North
Vietnamese border.

Others were on the Ho Chi Minh Trail,

defending it or using it while enroute to South Vietnam.
The Pathet Lao controlled two-thirds of the territory of
Laos, and North Vietnamese military forces were taking
extensive measures to extend and firm Pathet Lao control
before the agreement,
would be required.

anticipating that their withdrawal.

The agreement was made in July, 1962,

and troops were to be withdrawn by October.

In August,

American reconnaissance aircraft found a convoy of combat
troops with their equipment moving from North Vietnam into
the Plain of Jars in north central Laos and dispersing to
the south.

Armed control posts were established along the

border at entry points into Vietnam and at several airfields
in Laos near these routes.

The number of North Vietnamese

troops were thus increasing rather than decreasing at this
time.

By the end of August, the British Foreign Office

estimated that 10,000 North Vietnamese troops were in Laos.
It is unknown how many of these forces withdrew in
accordance with the agreement, but many did remain.

North

Vietnam reported in October that all their troops had been
23
removed,
but many had simply shifted to civilian clothing
so that it could be claimed that they were non-military.

^ New York Times, Oct. 10, 1962.
2^Tliae. Oct. 12, 1962, p. 32.
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The International Control Commission was able to verify
the departure of only forty of these 10,000 troops.

25

Reports of North Vietnamese military activity in Laos
continued, and in December the United States expressed
concern over the presence of North Vietnamese troops.

26

Some Pathet Lao troops were integrated into the Royal
Laotian armed forces as part of the coalition agreement.
American military forces consisted of 666 advisors
„ 27
as of July, 1962.
They were stationed with the Meo
tribesmen in northeastern Laos, opposing the Pathet Lao,
North Vietnamese,

and Viet Cong.

This aid was being given

to support the governments of both Laos and South Vietnam.
All of these forces were removed by the October, 1962
deadline.

The United States had also been supplying large

quantities of both military and economic equipment.

These

American supplies were being airlifted by Air America,
so-called non-military aircraft under contract with the
United States government.

Non-military aircraft were not

excluded by the neutralization agreement,
were not delivering military equipment.

so long as they
This airlift

continued after October, 1962, in the form of food dropped
to the Meo tribes, but delivery of military equipment was
stopped.

^ D o m m e n , p. 240; and New York Times, Nov.11, 1962, p.
^^New York Times, Dec. 14, 1962.
27Tlme, Oct. 12, 1962, p. 32.

A year earlier, American military aid on a much greater
level had been ready for use in Laos, reaching the point of
preparations for Invasion.

It was prepared to support the

right wing government under Boun Oum who was in danger of
being overthrown by Soviet and North Vietnamese supported
communists.

Marines had been embarked on board the ships

of the U. S. Seventh Fleet, and those ships had moved into
the South China Sea.

Aircraft had been loaded with supplies

and prepared for bombing missions, and U; S. Marines had
landed in Thailand across the Mekong River from Vientiane.
These preparations for Invasions had been made to persuade
the Soviet Union to cooperate in neutralizing Laos.

They

coincided with President Kennedy's announcement at a press
conference on March 15, 1961, that the United States “strongly
and unreservedly supported the goal of a truly neutral Laos".
He threatened that if the attacks by erternally supported
communist forces did not stop, those who did not support a
neutral Laos would have to bear the consequences.

This threat

was instrumental in bringing about a cease fire in May and
international talks leading to the neutralization agreement.
These additional military forces were withdrawn after serving
that purpose. 28

28Arthur Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, (Boston:

Houghton Mifflin, 1965), p. 3 6 6 ; 'and Time,
March 18, 1961, p. 8-10.

Before the agreement, the Soviet Union was providing
food, fuel, howitzers, mortars, and operators for military
equipment.

This equipment was being airlifted from Hanoi

to the headquarters of a rival government in Khang Khay in
the Plain of Jars, communist Pathet Lao country.

A coalition

government had been set up there, joining former neutralist
Souvanna Phouma with the Pathet Lao.
was used for this Soviet equipment.

Non-military transport
The flights continued

after the neutralization until November, 1964.

Nine of the

Soviet transport aircraft were turned over to the government
of Laos in December, 1962, after the rival government was
disbanded, for use in airlifting government supplies to
troops and refugees in remote areas.

During this period of

the first two years of Laotian neutrality, Laos was governed
by a coalition of factions, and both American and Soviet
airlifts were being used to support the policies of that
government.

It was therefore not being used at that time
29
as a means of competition between these two powers.
There were also Chinese communist workers and technicians

in Laos, who remained in Laos after the deadline for removal
of troops.

All French military personnel departed, with the

exception of a few advisors who were permitted to remain,
according to a special provision of the treaty, so long as
their presence was desired by the Laotian government.

^Domrnen, pp. 233 — 2 ^ .

Thus, in implementing the neutralization treaty,
foreign military forces, except some authorized French
troops, were reported to have been removed.

However,

some foreign military activity continued, Justified by
identifying it as non-military or civilian.

Foreign

nations ceased overt interference, except for some inter
vention requested by Laos to oppose intervention by other
pations.

Efforts were made by the external nations to

give the appearance of complying with the neutralization
agreement, and in most cases there was compliance with
the letter of the agreement.

Direct intervention in the

affairs of Laos was reduced for a while.
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INTERNAL ACTIONS TO ESTABLISH NEUTRALIZATION

The other half of the process of establishing a
condition of neutralization is the part played by the
nation being neutralized.
Normally,

there is a declaration of a policy of permanent

neutrality,
effect.
cases.

It becomes permanently neutral.

followed by steps to put that policy into

Again let us see how this has been done in actual
These actions may be voluntary or imposed by the

neutralizing nations.

Switzerland had already established a tradition of
neutrality which had lasted for over a century when it was
Interrupted by the European wars of 1798-1815.
helped Switzerland to restore that status.

Neutralization

Switzerland

asserted its neutrality willingly and in compliance with
treaty requirements, and has voluntarily reaffirmed it on
many occasions since.

It has remained armed and has been

prepared to defend its neutrality by force If necessary.
Luxembourg also officially declared a policy of
neutrality,

and even went so far as to Include a statement

to that effect In its constitution.

Borders were closed to

foreign armies, and the country itself, Including Its great
fortresses, was demilitarized in accordance with the treaty

3k

1867*

Because of Its small size and lack of armed forces,

there was little it could do to prevent Interference from
outside, but it could and did insist on maintaining a
neutral policy.
Belgium, on the other hand,
its neutrality*

did little to establish

It did desire independence as well as no

intervention from its more powerful neighbors.

However,

the

requirement to be neutral was Imposed without considering
the desires of Belgium,
comply.

and the nation had no choice but to

In this case, then, there was no positive action

but merely a passive compliance.

Maintenance of the status

depended on the cooperation of the guaranteeing powers and
ended when those powers came to blows.

30

Austrian neutralization was like that of Switzerland,
as stated in the Moscow Memorandum.

A major step in the

process was the enactment by the Austrian Parliament of a
policy of permanent neutrality,
means at its disposal11.
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to be guarded nby all

The nation would engage in no

policy leading to war Involvement, no offensive or defensive
alliances, and acceptance of no military aid or bases.
Austria would not participate in guaranteeing the neutrality
of any other state.

No passage of troops through Austria

would be permitted.

Austria would go to war if attacked,

to defend its neutral status.

The Austrian government has

S.Senate Committee on Foreigh Relations,
Neutralization In Southeast Asia, p . 20.
-^ Quoted in Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 19,
1953, PP- 1011-1012.
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restated these principles on several occasions since, when
threatened by military activity in neighboring countries.
Furthermore, in accordance with the treaty, Austria sought
and received international recognition of its neutral status.
Agreement by the fourteen nations to neutralization of
Laos was preceded by much effort within Laos to establish an
internal policy of neutrality.

This Btarted with

negotiations between representatives of the three contending
factions: one communist, one anti-communist, and the third
desiring neutrality.

They ultimately agreed to a cease fire,

formation of a coalition government, and a formal statement
of neutrality.

This statement was presented to the other

thirteen nations and became the key part of the neutralization
agreement.

The statement declared that Laos would engage in

friendly equal relations with foreign nations, protect its
Independence, not interfere with or use force in other
countries, not enter military alliances or permit foreign
military bases In Laos, not allow foreign interference in
Laos, and not permit foreign military personnel in Laos.
But it would accept economic aid and respect treaties not
32
interfering with Laotian neutrality.
The formation of a coalition government was faced with
great obstacles, similar to those hindering an earlier
coalition formed in response to the 195** Geneva Convention.

“^Black, pp. 169-17**
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That convention stated that Laos was to establish a coalition
government through elections to be held In 1955.

General

elections were held in December, 1955, hut the two provinces
held by the communist Pathet Lao did not participate.
Prince Souvanna Phouma became Prime Minister and proceeded
with a program to comply with the provisions of the Geneva
Convention.

Efforts to induce the Pathet Lao to cooperate

in joining a coalition government included visits by the
Prime Minister to Peking, Moscow and Hanoi to get backing
for a government which would include integration of the
Pathet Lao and the two provinces which they controlled.
By 1957 the coalition government was set up and the communists
were assigned the two key cabinet positions: Minister of
Planning, and Mihlster of Reconstruction and Urbanization.
The Pathet Lao became legitimate by launching its political
party, Neo Lao Hak Sat (Lao Patriotic Front).

Supplementary

elections were held In the former excluded provinces, and
measures were started to Integrate the armies of the two
factions.
These coalition efforts did not last long.

The Neo

Lao Hak Sat party directed its efforts to consolidating its
gains so that, although the nation was united politically,
the people in areas controlled by the Pathet Lao would remain
under their control.

Intense indoctrination was Instituted

by the Pathet Lao there, and hostages taken from families
to North Vietnam to Insure their loyalty.

In 1958
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the communist ministers were dismissed from the government,
ending the coalition.
This failure to establish a neutral coalition govern
ment showed that there were great obstacles to the success
of such a government after the 1962 neutralization, although
chances for success might be Improved if foreign interference
were ended.

In an effort to promote neutralization and to

end conflict within the nation, leaders of rival factions
met repeatedly In 1961.

Finally, in June they agreed to

form another coalition.

This agreement was not to be

Implemented until a year later.

Since the leaders could

not agree on the composition of the government,

they agreed

to ask the King to choose the members, and they agreed to
abide by his decision.

Normally,

the King was a ceremonial

figure remaining free from politics.

However, his existence

at this time provided a means, not available to most nations,
of settling disputes.
To establish this three-faction coalition, Souvanna
Phouma replaced U.S.-backed right-wing Boun Oura as Prime
Minister in accordance with the King's decision.

Neo Lao

Hak Sat leaders Souphanouvong and Vongvichit were assigned
cabinet posts of Minister of Economy and Planning and
Minister of Information and Tourism, respectively.

The

framework of a coalition government was thus provided.
However,

as we shall see later,

divided to be effective.

the factions were too

The Prime Minister was unable
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to get support of either the right or left wings of the
coalition.
Austria also formed a coalition government at the time
of Its neutralization.
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The major purpose of the coalition

was to present a unanimous acceptance of neutrality and the
other conditions of the State Treaty of Austria by which
foreign occupation troops were removed.

This was a coalition

between the two major parties: the conservative People1s
Party and the Socialist Party.

Both joined in negotiations

with the Soviet Union and accepted the terms of the Moscow
Declaration of 1955-

This coalition did not have the

friction which Laos had because the parties were not so
Ideologically opposed and the communist party was not
represented.

It lasted until 1966 when the People's Party

won an absolute majority In the parliamentary election and
set up a conservative government,

causing no problem so far

as the neutrality policy was concerned.

Thus, it can be seen

that a coalition government is not a prerequisite for
neutralization so long as all major factions support the
policy.

33
Allard, p. 225*
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JOINT ACTIONS TO ESTABLISH NEUTRALIZATION

These actions, required independently by external
powers and the nation being neutralized, do not take into
account the fact that some joint actions are required by
both parties.

Military treaties,

especially mutual security

pacts, are inconsistent with neutralization since the
neutralized nation cannot fulfill its obligations.
these pacts must be cancelled.

Therefore,

Not only must foreign

military forces leave the territory of the neutralized state,
but military aid cannot be accepted nor requested from a
major power.

The Laotian neutralization treaty directed

withdrawal of all foreign military forces from Laos, with
the exception of the temporarily continued presence of a few
French forces.

The breakdown of Laotian neutralization has

Involved a combination of the refusal of North Vietnam to
withdraw its forces,

and the consequent granting of American

military support at the request of the Laotian government.
Not only must these military relations be curtailed, but
there may have to be some restrictions on other joint
actions.

Warfare is not Just a matter of military activity;

there is also economic, psychological and political warfare,
but treaties have been vague with respect to these other
types of warfare.

ko
As I have stated, the implementation of neutralization
requires that the nation stop doing whatever led to the
conflict in the first place.

Normally, it is not military

but economic, psychological and political actions which
di»aw nations into warfare.

Such non-military but unfriendly

actions are the substance of the Cold War,

and neutralization

includes imposing permanent neutralism with respect to the
Cold War.

It would thus seem to be logical that a

neutralization agreement should include requirements to
break economic, psychological or political ties and commit
ments between Cold War powers and the neutralized nation.
These requirements have been omitted because of practical
considerations.

Most of these ties simply cannot be broken.

No neutralized nation can be completely self-sufficient,

and

the external nations would not be willing to cease all
economic, political and psychological pressures on the
neutralized country.

For example, nations depend upon one

another for trade and foreign investments.
reporting,

Tourism, news

literature and many other forms of interrelations

form ties by which nations Influence one another.
In practice,

there have been some efforts to carry

neutralization beyond the military sphere, but they have
been limited.

An example is the Swiss decision not to Join

the United Nations because of the obligation for members to
Join in U.N.-Imposed sanctions against violators of the charter.

^Black, pp. 12-15, 51-59-

3^
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Austria has Ignored this complication and Joined that
organization*

Neither has requested membership in the

European Economic Community

or NATO because these two

organizations are seen by the Soviet Union and East Europe
as being directed against the communist bloc, and therefore
not neutralist.

Switzerland did Join the League of Nations,

but with special provisions to excuse it from applying
sanctions against offenders.

Recently the E.E.C, has been

working on .modifying its political goals in order that
Austria, Sweden and Switzerland might be able to have full
membership without violation of their policies of neutrality,^
These restrictions generally have been ignored in the formal
neutralization treaties because of the difficulty of carrying
them out.

An exception was the Laotian agreement which said

that no conditions of a political nature could be attached
to any assistance offered to Laos.

The Princeton study

model treaty has a proposed provision which would erempt a
neutralized member of the United Nations from participating
in not only military but economic and political sanctions
against other members.
More problems may be created by stopping economic ties
than continuing them*

Laos provides an extreme eTample.

•^Willy Zeller, ”The Neutrals and European Integration11,
.Swiss Review of World Affairs, Dec, 1970, p. ?•
^ Black, p. 194.
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Once economic aid was started and Laos came to depend upon
it, its cut-off had greater effects than continuing to
provide it.

The cut-off of economic relations can be a

severe form of sanctions, and is a measure provided in the
U.N. Charter to be used against offenders.

The American

pressure which contributed to the break-up of the coalition
government in 1958 was the temporary halt of U.S. aid to
Laos, thus preventing the communist members of the cabinet
from delivering it to the Pathet Lao.

On the other hand,

after neutralization, both the United States and the Soviet
Union continued economic aid but on a reduced scale.

In

fact, the continuance of this aid was used by both the United
States and the Soviet Union to persuade the factions which
each supported to cooperate in a cease fire and in the
neutralization negotiations.
For similar reasons, there is no need to curtail normal
trade relations, even though these relations are bound to
lead to trade commitments in the form of contracts, loans,
and long term agreements to import or export certain items.
All nations depend on one another economically for certain
things which they need.

Also, a requirement to end foreign

investments in the neutralized country would be unreasonable.
All parties to a neutralization should attempt to be impartial
and try to avoid economic ties which would have to be pro
tected in time of war, but It is usually not practical to
spell out these terms in a treaty.

Some problems which can
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result from attempts to limit economic ties will be
discussed further in the nert chapter about objectives
and results of neutralization.
The same principles apply to other areas.

Article 435

of the Treaty of Versailles contains a definition of the
rights and duties involved in “permanent neutrality11,
patterned on the experiences of Switzerland.

It states that

the neutral state is not bound to observe-an “ideological
neutrality", and that consequently it could allow political
rights such as free speech and press. 37 There is therefore
nothing to prevent the use of propaganda in a way that would
be against the spirit of neutrality, either by external
states or the neutralized state.

37

Verdoss, p. 66

EXTERNAL ACTIONS TO MAINTAIN NEUTRALIZATION

Once these Initial actions are taken to establish
neutralization,
that status.

they are followed by actions to maintain

The maintenance of neutralization first

requires the continuation of those measures taken to
establish neutralization in the first place.

Additional

measures may be required to prevent or stop violations.
It may be that the status is automatically continued
because it contributes to the international balance of
power, or it is in the Interest of each nation to continue
it.

Whatever conditions prompted the nations to agree to

the status might also provide sufficient incentive for them
to abide by that agreement.

But the world situation changes

and it is useful to have an understanding as to actions
which those nations wishing to continue the arrangement
may take in the event other nations decide to violate it.
These enforcement actions can be quite delicate,

since

unless they are administered Impartially, the enforcement
actions may themselves constitute a violation of the
neutralization agreement.
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OBSERVATION

Logically, enforcement measures would start with a
way of detecting Violations.

Ideally, this would be done

by representatives of nations or organizations having no
direct interest there, since interested parties would be
likely to be prejudiced.

Also needed is an arbitration

body to settle disputes over whether violations have
occurred, especially when one interested nation blames
another for the violations.

Finally, when it is determined

that a violation has occurred, sanctions or the threat of
sanctions may be required to stop the violation and to
restore neutralization.
The Laos example provided for observation of violations
but was vague about what was to be done about them.

The

observation task was given to the International Control
Commission.

This team had been established originally by

the earlier G-eneva Convention of 1954 to supervise implemen
tation of the cease fire and the establishment of independence
of the new nations formed from French Indochina.

Members of

this team were provided by Canada (anti— communist), Poland
(communist), and India (neutral).

This team was thus a

coalition of Interests, similar to the coalition government

of Laos, representing each extreme and a neutral.

The

neutralization agreement of 1962 gave that commission the
task of observing violations of that treaty as well.
Violations were to be reported to the Soviet Union and
United Kingdom, co-chairmen of the 195^ convention, who
would then take corrective action or call the convention
of nations which had participated in the 1962 agreement to
decide on appropriate action.
In practice, the International Control Commission has
never been effective.

The Soviet Union insisted in .196-3

that in most matters of Importance, the three representatives
on the commission must agree unanimously before submitting
recommendations or taking other action, and of course it
was difficult to act on conflicting reports anyway.

Poland

used Its veto power frequently to avoid investigating or
reporting suspected violations by North Vietnam.

Since the

I.C.C. was created in 195^, communist forces permitted very
little observation in those areas under their control.
When observation was permitted, careful preparations were
made to prevent their seeing incriminating evidence.

After

repeated failure of the I.C.C. to perform its functions, the
government of Laos finally requested American reconnaissance
aircraft to observe North Vietnamese activity in Laos, and
accordingly they were provided.

When these aircraft were

fired upon, military escorts were provided.

The military
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escorts eventually attacked anti-aircraft sites which were
firing at them, and so one violation led to another.^
Laos has been the only state whose neutralization
was observed by a neutral team.

In other cases, it has

been assumed that the neutralized government or the major
powers which had made the agreement could perform this
function.

Luxembourg and Belgium are small enough that

violations would be visible.

Furthermore, in those countries

the governments had control so that there would be no
problem conducting their own Investigations.

Laos did not

have this control over the communist territory.

Laos was

also unique In that the initial removal of foreign troops
was never completed.

Had this been done, and Laos gained

control of its borders, violations would not have been so
difficult to detect.

So it would seem that the failure of

the International Control Commission was not so much the
fault of the commission or of the treaty provisions which
provided for it, as it was the fault of neighboring North
Vietnam to implement the treaty in the first place, and of
the Laotian government to establish authority over its
entire territory.
Our historical examples do not give much useful
precedent for observation procedures.

In only one case was

machinery set up to do this, and in that case it failed.
The failure provides lessons as to problems to be overcome,

*^Dommen, pp. 240-258*
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but does not help much in constructing a model for future
cases.

A logical approach to the subject would be more

productive.

The observation team is basically looking for

instances in which the neutralized nation fails to follow
a neutral policy.

It is also looking for actions by external

nations Interfering in the affAirs of the neutralized nation.
In the first type of observations, violations should be quite
obvious.

Hostile actions against another state would

certainly be detected by the victim state.
would also be obvious.
on the other hand,
observation team.

Hostile threats .

Secret preparations for hostilities,

would be difficult to detect even by an
Obviously, the host government will not

voluntarily permit any outside team to observe these
activities.

Refusal of the host to permit the observation

team to have free access could be an indication of possible
violations, but this is not a fair conclusion since all
nations need to have some secrets to provide for their
national security.

It would thus seem that observation

teams are not very effective for detecting violations by
the neutralized country, since in order to detect violations
which are not already visible, the team would have to be
given powers which infringe upon the sovereignty of the
nation under observation to such an extent that no nation
would voluntarily consent.
The observation team would also be looking for
violations committed by other nations.

Certainly any state
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should be able to detect such activity within its borders
through its own police and military forces as easily as an
observation team could.

Laos is exceptional in that it did

not have effective control over Its territory, and the I.C.C.
was being called upon to perform a function which in normal
cases the government could do for itself.

The observation

team might also be expected to observe preparations for
violation In neighboring states; for example, massing of
troops and equipment in preparation for Invasion.

Again it

is doubtful that the nation concerned would permit
observation if it wished to keep such preparations secret.
Observation teams therefore are not effective for
detecting violations, but they can be used to investigate
reported or suspected violations and particularly to verify
that an alleged violation did not take place.

Minor or un

intentional violations could be investigated before they
caused retaliation and grew into problems.

Misunderstandings

oould be clarified when the facts were brought into the open
and explained by objective outsiders.

These.activities by

the observation team would provide some reassurance to each
nation that other nations were not cheating.

It is

particularly important that the team be Impartial.
While the Laos treaty did provide for means of
observation, it was vague as to measures to be taken once
the violations were detected.

The Soviet Union and Britain

have never been able to agree to convene the treaty members.

The Soviet Union would not agree to a convention to act on
charges of communist violations until anti-communist
violations Ceased, and Britain followed the same policy
when anti-communist violations were reported.
action was authorized by the treaty.

No other

Consequently, enforce

ment actions consisted of loud protests, along with un
authorized actions by Individual members in order to
investigate and stop violations by others.

51

ENFORCEMENT

Although earlier neutralization cases were silent
about observation or enforcement action, some principles
for enforcement action did evolve over the years.

In the

absence of impartial International organization to provide
observation teams or police forces, the neutralizing nations
themselves acted also as the guaranteeing nations.

It was

not clear whether all nations which had originally agreed
were to act jointly or whether they could act separately.
The generally accepted policy was that each participant In
the agreement had an obligation to guarantee the continuation
of neutralization, intervening individually to defend the
neutralized state if there was no policy or agreement for
Joint enforcement.

However, it was never clearly understood

Just how these obligations were to be carried out.

In the

case of Belgium, this was clarified somewhat by Great Britain
when France and Prussia conspired in 1866 to have Belgium
anneTed by France.

Britain made separate treaties with

France and Prussia that if either side violated Belgium* s
neutrality, Britain would assist the other to defend it.
Great Britain thus adopted a policy for joint action,
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although France and Prussia still claimed that separate
39
action would be permissible. The treaty with France was
implemented when Germany attacked Belgium in 1914.

In the

case of Luxembourg, the same question was debated but not
decided.
It is obvious that joint action by nations representing
both contending sides is a more effective way of maintaining
neutralization; but when one of the major powers whose
cooperation is needed to continue that condition fails to
cooperate, the neutralization agreement in effect has been
repudiated already.

Action by one guaranteeing nation to

restore neutralization may be possible if the offender is
forced to agree, but this may Involve contradictions.
Individual enforcement may serve to polarize the situation,
adding to the differences which are breaking down the
neutralized status.

The contention may develop into War,

fought over the neutralized country, making neutralization
impossible.

This situation is really no different from that

in Laos where convention members are supposed to take joint
action to restore neutralization but actually, because of
their own Interests, have been acting Independently.
All of these examples imply that enforcement sanctions
would be applied by the same nations which established the
neutralization initially.

Since they are all directly

involved and would be judging themselves or each other,

•^Black, pp. 25-26, 35-37

their actions are not likely to be successful.

Another

solution would be to put enforcement Into the hands of an
impartial International organization.

The United Nations

has attempted to perform this type of service.

An example

is the United Nations Emergency Force which observed the
Israeli truce from 1956 until 1967 .

However, international

teams of this nature have not had successful records because
they have not had the strength or authority to take necessary
action.

For example, UNEF functioned until the truce was

about to be violated.

It was then asked to leave, did so,

and was absent when its presence was most needed.

Another

problem Is that even the United Nations is not really Impartial,
but reflects Cold War conflict, and any team provided by it
might have the same problems interpreting their observations
that the I.C.C. had in Laos.
Too much emphasis should not be put on the Importance
of this enforcement machinery.

It cannot take the place of

a stable international system in which the interests of all
participating nations are served by complying with the
neutralization agreement.

As I will explain later, an

effective International balance of power system is far more
likely to maintain neutralization than the most elaborate
guarantees simply because International law has not developed
to the point where they can be enforced.

Peter Lyon claims

that the "successful maintenance of neutralization depends

5^
upon the continuation of the balance of power which produced
itB or on the “determination of the neutralized state to
resist encroachment on its status1*.

No treaties have

attempted to prescribe what enforcement action should be
taken.

This has been left to be decided by the treaty

participants when the occasion arises.

Presumably, the

neutralized nation should have a voice in this decision.
The Laos agreement specifically provided for Laos to be
included.

^l^ron, Neutralism, p. 93»
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INTERNAL ACTIONS TO MAINTAIN NEUTRALIZATION

In view of these many problems which arise when
external nations Intervene to enforce neutralization,
maintaining that status may depend upon the efforts of the
neutralized nation to preserve its own neutrality.

It will

be seen that the neutralized nation not only maintains a
passive avoidance of big power politics, but on occasion
may have to take positive actions to preserve its status.
This requires that the neutralized nation have a stable
government which will not change its neutral policy.

The

government should also be strong enough to control any
radical elements whose sympathies or connections with a
foreign power might threaten to draw that faction or the
whole nation Into controversies in which the power is engaged.
There should be wide public support for the neutral policy,
in spite of the sacrifices usually required.

This internal

support for the policy is probably even more Important than
possession of power to resist foreign intervention.

In fact,

some neutralized nations have been denied this power by
virtue of having been demilitarized.

These statements will

be explained further in the following paragraphs.

:
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Switzerland provides an excellent example of such
policies.

The success of Swiss neutralization Is largely

due to Swiss internal policy as^well as the external balance
of power and guarantees.

For example, in 1954 the Swiss

government took action to affirm its status by several self41
Imposed restrictions.
Switzerland would abstain from
starting any war.

It would defend its neutrality.

would avoid involvement with other nations which
lead to hostilities.

It
might

Switzerland has continued to reject

membership in the United Nations as well as other collective
security treaties which would give Switzerland the obligation
to take sides against an aggressor nation, even though the
42
neutralizing nations would accept it into that body.
The ability and determination of the Swiss to defend
their neutrality was demonstrated in 1871 during the Franco—
Prussian War when the Swiss army disarmed 80,000 French
troops who had taken refuge there and Interned them until
43
the end of the war.
It has provided services for
belligerents and rivals in peace time, but has taken pains
not to become involved In actions which would favor either
side.
Austria has made similar efforts to uphold its neutral
status.

During the Czech crisis of 1968, the Austrian

jfpBlack, PP • 22-23.
^lyon, Neutralism, p. 15^.
^Lauterpaciit, Vol.II, p. 2^5*
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government became concerned that Soviet forces invading
Czechoslovakia might violate Austrian territory.

Austrian

expressions of sympathy for their Czech neighbors appeared
in the press and made Soviet officials concerned that Austria
might be taking sides In that dispute.

The Austrian government

and political leaders took pains to call to the attention of
the world the fact that Austria intended to preserve its
neutrality.

Chancellor Klaus pledged that the government

would defend the status of permanent neutrality.

Volksblatt,

the newspaper of the majority Austrian political party
(Peopled Party) appealed to the Soviet Union to respect that
status.

Later, President Jonas reaffirmed Austria's permanent

neutrality, quoting the treaty provisions which obligated

44

Austria to defend that neutrality "with all possible means11,
Belgium did little to preserve its neutrality, except
that In each war between neighboring nations, it took
45
military measures to defend Its territory.
It was helpless
anyway when Invaded by Germany in 1914.
The government of Laos has made many attempts to play
the role of a neutral, but it has been difficult in view of

the foreign troops on its territory, and the internal division
of the country.

In 196?, for example, Prime Minister Souvanna

Phouma refused permission for American forces to come in and
block the Ho Chi Minh Trail, but at the same time objected
verbally to its use by North Vietnam.

New York Times, Sent.19, 1968, p. 13; Sept.21, 1968,
..p. 4; Oct.6, 1968, p. 10; Oct. 27, 1968, p. 12.
^Lauterpacht, Vol. I, p. 632.

It Is not enough that the neutralized nation do what
it can to keep other nations from violating its status.
To get back to the basic definitions of neutralization, it
is a matter of the neutralized nation permanently following
a policy of avoiding hostile actions with other nations.

It

is therefore essential that its government consistently
continue that policy despite differences between internal
factions and changes of government.

By definition, the

whole arrangement collapses If the government rejects its
obligations.

The external powers can continue to refrain

from Intervention, but the permanent neutrality will have
ceased.

Furthermore, If a faction rejecting neutrality

comes into power, it probably means that it favors alliance
with a major power, In which case the power concerned would
most likely respond in kind.

This is why attention was given

to the establishment in Laos of a HneutralM government; that
is, one which could he depended upon to declare and maintain
a neutral policy.

Little attention had been given to the

governments of other neutralized nations, so long as they
declared a neutral policy initially.

Either It was assumed

that the government would abide by its pledge, as in the
case of Austria, or the external powers were in a position
to see that the government remained neutral whether It
wanted to or not, as in the case of Belgium.
It is interesting to note that there have been brief
periods of internal crisis within Switzerland which have
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coincided with taik of intervention by neighboring powers.
For example, during the Swiss Civil War of 1847 reactionary
European powers were concerned that events in Switzerland
might encourage uprisings by liberal groups in their own
countries.

The uprising was suppressed quickly by the
46
government before Intervention could take place;
but
this incident shows that when a nation becomes divided, it
does not take long for sympathies of other nations or of
groups within them to be drawn to one or the other of the
contending factions.

This can easily lead to intervention

either to assist the government to restore order, or to
assist the rebels to set up a more favorable government,
A similar political division in Cracow during the
same decade started events which led to intervention by
Austria, Prussia and Russia to prevent revolutionary forces
from establishing headquarters in Cracow as a threat to the
governments of those three powers.

This intervention led

to the end of neutralization of Cracow a few years later.
Laos also is divided and therefore presents this
problem.

Neither the right-wing nor the left-wing factions

support a policy of neutrality*

Even if a centrist faction

favoring neutrality were in power, both opposing factions
factions would be continually acting to disrupt that policy;
so it was decided that only a coalition government could
be neutral.

No international agreement was made until

46Heinz K. Meier, The United States and Switzerland
In The Nineteenth Century, iThe Hague: Mouton & Co.,
1963), ppV 26-28.
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leaders of the three factions promised to establish a
coalition neutral government.
The Prime Minister organized and has made great efforts
to continue this coalition government, but he has been beset
with the same type of problems that took place in the attempt
to maintain the 195^ coalition government.
was too divided to function.

The government

After only three and one-half

months of Ineffective government, the Prime Minister was
given special powers to rule without requiring the confidence
of the National Assembly.

He was thus enabled to ignore the

other two factions of the coalition government.

NLHS

representatives quit the government in the spring of 1963 .
In order to keep the form of a neutralist government,
Souvanna Phouma left these vacated positions open for their
return.

Elections in 19^5 were boycotted by the NLHS on
47
the claim that they were illegal.
Attempts to continue

a neutral coalition government in Laos, although attempted
in good faith, can be seen to be a farce for the purpose of
governing the country.

But the coalition did serve the

initial purpose of enabling the Soviet Union and the United
States to disengage in '19-62, and the pretense of continuing
it has provided a deterrent to even greater foreign inter
vention than has occurred.

Laos still claims to be neutral

ized and has a basis for objecting to foreign troops on its
territory.

47

Foreign Policy Association, ttWho Is The Adversary?11,
Headline Series. April, 1968 , p. 54.
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Despite these failures, one factor can be seen to
have operated in favor of neutralization.

A strong Prime

Minister was able to provide stability in the government
through his own continuation in power, whereas earlier in
1958 a change in government had caused a rejection of
neutralization efforts established by the Geneva Convention.
Unfortunately, the prime Minister was handicapped by his
inability to hold support of political rivals.

Not only

was the government unable to obtain support of the people
in communist controlled provinces, but many Influential
families In other provinces who opposed communist reforms
put family loyalty ahead of national loyalty.
The case of Laos also illustrates that a coalition
government composed of representatives from factions with
Incompatible ideologies is not practicable.

It Is Impossible

for the government to make policy which would satisfy all
factions, and each member continues to participate so long
as it assumes that It can eventually dominate the government.
A willingness to compromise and Join in a consensus is
necessary to the success of any political system unless the
dominant power is able to force submission of the opposing
faction.
An alternative to a coalition government should be
mentioned, which might function more effectively.

That is

a centrist government following a neutral policy which would
exclude participation by radical factions.

In fact, this is
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what the present government of Laos really is, since the
centrist Prime Minister has been given sufficient power
to ignore those who do not agree with him.

There are

obvious problems with this solution, too, since the
government may not be able to satisfy or control dissenting
groups.

The radical Left claimed they had no representation

in the Laotian government, and in effect seceded and Joined
forces again with North Vietnam.
The above discussion illustrates the advantage of
having a government in the neutralized nation to be not
only neutral but also sufficiently strong and stable to
prevent dissenting factions from upsetting the neutralization
agreement.

More generally, the political situation should be

such that the government will not revise the policy of
neutrality.

Switzerland and Austria provide examples of the

continued existence of such governments.

In both of these

countries political changes have not been great enough to
threaten permanent neutrality.
This requirement for a strong government refers to
strength to govern the domestic affairs of the country
effectively.

It does not imply a necessity for strong

military power for its foreign relations.

It might seem

that such strength would be necessary, or at least preferable
to reliance on the strength of other powers.

In practice,

neutralized nations have always been small nations not able
to match the military strength of the neutralizing powers.
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Luxembourg maintained its neutrality for half a century as
a tiny demilitarized nation, determined to retain Its
neutrality and thereby Its independence.
Several points have been made In the preceding pages
regarding actions which have been taken or attempted by the
neutralized nations in order to maintain their status.
They may have to take positive steps to assert their
neutrality when it Is threatened, and take further actions
to defend it.

They are expected not to have any commitments

which would involve them in conflicts in foreign nations,
and not take any aggressive actions.

Their governments

should be sufficiently stable and strong to continue the
neutral policy and to suppress factions which might want
to disrupt that policy.
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JOINT ACTIONS TO MAINTAIN NEUTRALIZATION

In separating for purposes of analysis the external
and Internal neutralization actions, we should not lose
sight of the fact that neutralization is largely a cooperative
effort between all parties.

Military alliances and other

commitments once broken cannot be renewed.

Generally,

whatever acts have led to dangerous rivalry in the past
should be avoided in the future.

Actions to be avoided

have been previously discussed, and this avoidance should
be continued.

Equally Important are positive attitudes

and principles, to be developed.

Little can be accomplished

if it is based only on negative restrictions.

A common

understanding and mutual trust should be developed between
all parties, between potentially rival external nations,
and between the external nations and the neutralized nation.
Methods to resolve arguments should be worked out without
having to resort to outside enforcement machinery.

These

are matters to be accomplished through patient and
cooperative diplomacy.
The neutralized nation should be impartial in its
dealings with major powers.

It should not try to play one

against the other in order to obtain aid from both sides.

On the part of the major powers, there should he a
willingness to avoid economic and psychological competition
over the neutralized nation.

There should be a sharing of

resources obtained from It, and care should be taken not
to dominate its economy through excessive foreign invest
ments, nor to provide a monopoly market for its exports.

CHAPTER III
NEUTRALIZATION AS A DEVICE

In the previous chapter I defined neutralization,
and explained what actions are required to establish and
maintain a status of neutralization.

This background

can be applied to Israel, to decide whether Israel could
be neutralized, and how.

But there is little point in

making this application if we do not decide what purpose
neutralization is designed to achieve and what other
results there might be.

Consequently, this chapter will

investigate the purposes and results of neutralization,
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PURPOSES

According to most authorities, the purpose of
neutralization Is to remove an area from strife between
the great powers.

In my introduction, I quoted Peter Lyon1s

statement that neutralization is a “device...by which great
powers...endeavor to remove small but strategically important
territories outside the active sphere on international
rivalries".

Similarly, Black states that "its role is

limited to the search for ways to remove minor states from
arenas of destructive regional and global competition".
These statements of purpose are little more than elaborations
on the definition of neutralization.

They are worth noting

for what they omit because one should not condemn neutralization
for failing to accomplish something which it is not designed
for.

Neutralization is not necessarily supposed to put an

end to strife in the neutralized area, nor between the great
powers, but simply to keep such conflicts separated.

Other

additional desirable results are bonuses, but even the
separation of conflicts would be a step toward order in
international relations.

•Black, p. vl

Realistically, neutralization has
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little chance of success where there is conflict; rather,
it can be used best where conflicts have already been
brought under control and a balance of power prevails.
The statements of purpose given above infer that
neutralization is used not only to keep the neutralized
nation out of war, but also out of peace time rivalries.
It therefore has some appeal for many neutralist or nonaligned nations of the "Third World".

For example,

Cecil V. Crabb explains that neutralist countries frequently
call upon both Cold War camps to respect the decision of
those countries to follow a neutralist course, and that
those countries which have had neutralization imposed upon
them (Austria and Laos) insist that the great powers abide
by the terras of their own agreements and cease endeavoring
to “align" such countries with their respective Cold War
49
systems.
In most cases these nations prefer that the
great powers simply recognize their neutrality rather than
guarantee it because guaranteeing actions often take the
form of intervention.
Neutralization may be described as a device for
managing International power.

As such, it supplements

the balance of power system and contributes to International
stability.

However, nations are more interested in protecting

their own interests than in building international order*

^C e c l l V. Grabb, The Elephants and The Grass,
(New York: Praeger, 1965 T, "p." '93.
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In searching for practical purposes for neutralization, it
is therefore more useful to investigate what it accomplishes
from the points of view of the participating nations.
For the neutralized nation, it may he the means of
obtaining or preserving its Independence, or it may be a
means of preserving its territorial integrity.

For Austria,

it put an end to the four-power occupation which had
continued since the end of World War II hostilities and
provided Independence.

Similarly, it was the only way that

Luxembourg could have its independence established and
guaranteed.

For Switzerland, rather than ending occupation,

It has prevented aggression.

It was supposed to end

occupation and prevent aggression in Laos but it failed.
Neutralization may serve the national Interests of
the external powers.

For the United States, Britain and

France, it served the purpose of removing Soviet troops from
Austria.

It allowed the U.S.S.R. to remove troops from

Austria for use elsewhere, without having to be concerned
about Austria's coming under control of the United States
and Western Europe. ^

It put a neutral wedge into NATO

territory and created a buffer.
In Laos, the objective was similar for the major
powers.

It reduced the level of Intervention, thereby

permitting each to reduce its own commitment.

It also

avoided conflict between those powers in behalf of interests

^°Blach, p. 27, PP- 112-113
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which were not worth war,

51

A variation of these objectives is seen where the
need to provide independence for the neutralized area does
not exist.

For example, the oceans are neutralized by inter

national law, giving all nations free use of the seas.

The

uninhabited Antarctic continent was neutralized in 1959 "by
the twelve nations participating in the International Geo
physical Year where they agreed to use the continent only
for peaceful purposes.

In such cases, the purpose may be

to avoid conflict by sharing the use of the area rather
than by non-intervention.

This might have an application

in the Middle East where big power Interests are so strong.
For example, sharing the use of the Suez Canal, oil sources
and pipelines would be a more practical solution than
agreeing not to use them.
In Switzerland and Belgium in 1839, *&he objective was
52
to prevent a renewal of French expansion.
Later It provided
protection against the threat to Western Europe of a new
unified Germany.

In these cases it served to create a

buffer state between the great powers.
example of a buffer.

Austria is another

Similarly, a neutral Laos would block

communist expansion and the extension of Chinese power to
Thailand, Cambodia and beyond.

Seen from China, Laos would

also be a buffer to American and other unfriendly interests
toward Chinese territory.

•^Black, p. 59, PP* 112-114.
Black, p. 59.
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In recent times, the ideological conflict between the
United States and the Soviet Union complicates agreement on
objectives.

While both parties would agree on the advisability

of agreeing not to fight over an area, there remains a
difference in what each power hopes or assumes will happen
In a neutralized state.

According to the principle of peace

ful coexistence, the Soviet Union would be likely to assume
that there would be an evolution toward socialism and
communism without the necessity of its intervention.

After

neutralization, Mr. Khrushchev bragged that Laos would fall
to communism like a ripe apple.
On the other hand, the United States would be likely
to assume that neutralization would provide an atmosphere
favorable to a stable government and the status quo.
Revolutionary movements would be seen by the United States
as evidence of intervention by the Soviet Union, while
opposition to such movements would be seen by the Soviet
Union as intervention by the United States.
accuse the other of violating neutralization.

Each would
Existing

governments would appeal to the United States for protection,
while revolutionary groups would appeal to the Soviet Union
for backing.

Under these circumstances, it would be most

difficult for these two powers to refrain from taking sides
and giving support to opposing factions.

This Is why all

the major factions in Austria and Laos agreed, rather than

•^Schleslnger, p. 334.

72
only the official government, although this agreement
quickly broke down in Laos.

Other external powers would

be likely to become Involved in the same way in this Cold
War rivalry.

For these reasons, one should take care not

to view neutralization from only the perspective of anti
communist interests and assume that communist Interests
would take a similar view.
This ideological competition should not be exaggerated
to the point of assuming that no agreement can be reached.
Both the United States and the Soviet Union have indicated
In public statements that they are willing to cooperate —
the Soviet Union in its calls for “peaceful coexistence11,
and the United States in President Nixon's “State of The
World 11 message of February, 1970.
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The Soviet attitude toward neutralization has been
tied closely to its policy of peaceful coexistence.

Austrian

neutralization was advocated at the time that the peaceful
coexistence policy was being launched.

The Soviet Union

argued that the neutralization of Austria would be a pre
cedent to be followed throughout the Third World.
Neutral nations would thereby be joining the “peace camp“,
breaking commitments to the Western nations.

The “positive

neutrality 11 adopted by Egypt is an example of the result
which was desired., Egypt renounced foreign influence and

•^Richard Nixon, U. S. Foreign Policy For The 197Qfs,
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office,
Feb. 18, 1970), pp. 133-138.
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ties, but then accepted Soviet bloc trade.

This explains

why it was important to the Soviet Union that Austria
should declare its permanent neutrality and request
recognition by other nations.

The Soviet Union could

respond to this, rather than take the formal initiative.
It also explains why It was important to.the Soviet Union
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that the term “neutrality“ be associated with Austria.
It was not sufficient that other nations simply recognize
Austrian IndependenceP which was accomplished through the
acceptance of the State Treaty of Austria, but other nations
should also recognize its neutrality.
The Soviet attitude toward neutralization is briefly
summed up In the 1954 edition of the Great Soviet Encyclo
pedia which stated that the Soviet Union “used the Insti
tution of neutrality as a means of strengthening its own
as well as the world's security".
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The United States was generally skeptical of
neutralization in the 1 9 5 0 rs and early i9 6 0 1s for the same
reasons it distrusted neutralism.

It feared that those

nations which did not take a stand against communist
pressures would eventually succumb to them.

Recently the

United States has changed to a policy of tolerating neutralism
and therefore might be more receptive to the idea of imposing
it by neutralization.

^Allard, p. 225; Black, p. 10, pp. 45-47.
Lyon, Neutralism, pp. 41-43.

The attitude of Communist China toward neutralization
can be seen in a study of Its attitude toward Third World
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nations from 1957 to i 960 , by A. M. Halpern.
China strongly
promoted the development of neutrality for the main purpose
of opposing Western influence (called Imperialism in Chinese
propaganda) in these nations.

First, China encouraged

nationalist feelings in those countries to reject foreign
Influence, in the name of neutrality.

Next followed an

attempt to develop partnerships with the people of those
countries to oppose Western influence.

Yugoslavia was

condemned because it used its neutralist policy to justify
Independence from the communist countries instead of joining
with China and Third World powers against Western imperialism.
Likewise, China attempted to justify support of North Viet
namese military intervention in Laos in the name of neutrality,
although it was designed to remove opposition to communism
there.
This concept of neutralization is similar to the way
the term is used in military operations.

Neutralization in

a military sense refers to removing all opposition, rather
than establishing a neutral situation.

In the political

competition of the Cold War, neutralization can easily
take on that meaning, although the major powers concerned
may claim to be setting up a truly neutral situation.

^A . M . Halpern, The Chinese Communist Line On
Neutralism, Publication P—2026 , {3anta .Monica. ^
Math Division, The RAND Corporation, July 1, i960 )
(also published In China Quarterly, Jan.-March,
1 9 6 1 ), pp. 90 - 115 .
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ACHIEVEMENTS AND RESULTS

Having stated what the objectives of neutralization
are, let us see how well they have been achieved and what
other effects have come from it.
In some cases, neutrality was maintained permanently
or for a long period of time. Switzerland maintained its
neutrality through the revolutions of 1830 and 1847-1850,
and the wars of 1870 - 1871 , 1914-1918, and 1939-1945.
Similarly, Belgian neutrality lasted from 1831 until 1914,
surviving through several wars.

A neutralist position has

been maintained by Austria and Switzerland through the
strains of the Cold War.

The strains on Austria were

particularly great during Soviet military intervention
in neighboring Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and NATO military
exercises in neighboring countries to the west.
The results of Austrian neutralization may be seen
more clearly by comparing them with development in Germany.
Austria and Germany were in similar circumstances after
World War II, both being divided and occupied by the big
four powers.

Austria remains outside of the Cold War conflicts

while Germany continues to be divided and a source of friction
between the major powers.

On the negative side, neutralization has ended in
various ways.

In Belgium and Luxembourg, it ended when

Germany, one of the guaranteeing powers, deliberately
violated it, invading those countries In 1914.

France and.

Great Britain attempted to stop this violation by coming
to their defense, and World War I followed.

So, while

neutralization kept Belgium and Luxembourg out of military
conflict for many years, it also eventually contributed to
war on a large scale.

When one guarantor nation is deter

mined to violate neutrality and others desire to enforce
it, war is very likely to follow.

On the other hand, in

1914 the final outcome was the defeat of the violator.
The city-state of Cracow was neutralized by a treaty
of 1815 but it was unable to survive the pressures of war
between neighboring powers.

The treaty had provided for

the closing of Cracow to refugees.

Subsequently, it was

entered by both Austria and Russia to retrieve political
refugees and then annexed by Austria in 1846.

Again this

shows how enforcement measures can result in increased
chances of war because they justify the very Intervention
that neutralization is supposed to prevent.
Whether Laos is still neutralized Is debatable.
Officially, the agreement is still in effect, but it is
being violated regularly by participating states.

The

government of Laos has maintained a neutralist position
but has never gained control of the leftist Bathet Lao.

77
'The agreement does appear to have reduced military inter
vention by outside nations, especially the Soviet Union
and the United States, but not by North Vietnam.

Without

neutralization the situation in Laos probably would have
followed a course more like developments in South Vietnam.
Neutralization did continue to hinder increased and more
open Involvement In Laos by the major powers but has not
prevented it.
In those cases where neutralization has survived, It
has had effects other than those which were the main
objectives sought.

Neutralization has brought economic

and other incidental benefits to Switzerland.

Bankers the

world over have a confidence that Switzerland will remain
neutral while their own countries are engaged in coups and
wars.

Consequently, Switzerland has become a world banking

center.

Switzerland^ reputation as a neutral has also made

It a first choice where nations mav meet to negotiate
treaties.

Geneva has become almost a world capital because

of its frequent use as a diplomatic convention center,
bringing money and prestige to Switzerland.
On the other hand, neutralization is sometimes an
economic handicap.

It can mean that the neutralized nation

is not permitted to join economic pacts.

For example, the

Soviet Union objects to Austria*s' Joining the European
Economic Community since it sees that organization as being
directed against the economics of the nations of Eastern
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Europe and the Soviet Union.

Switzerland likewise Is fore

going the advantages of E.E.C. membership.
In Luxembourg demilitarization has been an economic
benefit since military expenditures could be diverted for
other uses.

However, in most cases the neutralized nation

has had to continue high military spending in order to
maintain forces capable of defending the neutralized status.
Neutralization imposes some political handicaps on
the neutralized nation since that nation must abide by the
neutral policy and the restrictions which it entails.
- Neutralized nations have been handicapped In their
ability to grow in power.

This is most obviously seen in

the absence of territorial expansion and in the fact that
these nations have not used force or other pressure on
other nations.

They must be content with their lot.

Conversely, these nations have not decreased in power either
where the agreement was not violated.
of course the nation suffers.

When it is violated,

Belgium did lose its inde

pendence for a while when invaded by Germany, and Laos is
weakened by war.

Switzerland has been an exception, being

able to maintain absolute control over its own Internal
affaire.

In its foreign affairs it has refrained from

making treaty commitments with foreign powers.

This has

not been a handicap because it conforms to the Interests
of the nation.
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The neutralization of Laos has produced an artificial
coalition government.

This is an Infringement on the

nation since It is not free to modify its own government
In ways which would make it more effective.

Attempts to

form a government representing the majority party have been
defeated because it oould violate part of the neutralization
agreement.

Consequently, the government continues to be a

mixture of incompatible parties opposing one another, with
the communist party refusing to participate, and the
positions assigned to the communist party being in effect
unfilled.

The Prime Minister has taken on these additional

executive powers himself, resulting in concentration of
actual power.

In other words, the coalition government is
i
established only in form to comply with the International
agreement but is a hindrance to effective government.
Black noted that the ultimate result of widespread
use of neutralization would be to further strengthen the
powerful nations at the expense of the already weaker
58
neutralized nations.
This is because of the limitations
against expansion or joining alliances by the neutralized
nations, and because of the enforcement powers assumed by
the big nations.

The latter would ultimately find themselves

in a position similar to that of the Security Council of the
United Nations, with authority and responsibility for
maintaining world order.

■^Black, p. 64.
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FAVORABLE AND UNFAVORABLE FACTORS

This discussion shows that neutralization may or may
not achieve certain desired goals, and that it usually
has many other results, some of which are favorable and
some are not.

These effects of neutralization give more

clues about the factors which determine whether a nation
o r t h e International situation is suitable for successful
neutralization.

An investigation into those factors will

provide a basis for estimating whether an application in
the Middle East would be feasible.
One obvious factor is compatibility with interests
of those nations capable of disrupting it.
pointed out that those nations

Previously I

which have Interests in

the neutralized nation are the ones which should participate
in an agreement.

If they would gain

by continued or in

creasing involvement in the neutralized nation in the hope
of gaining access to waterways, ports, resources, etc.,
they could not be expected to agree to a neutralization
treaty or to comply with it if they did agree.
Not only must the initial agreement be in the interests
of the participants, but as the arrangement is put to the
test through the years, it must continue to be in their
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interests.

Fred Oreene traces the continuation and final

failure of Belgian neutrality through its history and
brings out how that agreement was reevaluated and renewed
each time it was confronted with a crisis.

Sometimes the

renewal strengthened it and sometimes weakened it, depending
on the extent to which the guaranteeing powers were prepared
to enforce it; but as long as each decided that the agree
ment served its self-interest, the agreement survived.
Previously I said that an effective balance of power
is important to the maintenance of neutralization.
Therefore, it must be included as one of the factors
contributing to its success.

The balance of power is a

system which maintains International order by distribution
of international power.

When a nation attempts to upset

that order and exert its power on other nations, the balance
of power system causes them to join and use their power in
opposition, thereby restoring order.

This system may

operate by deliberate efforts on the part of statesmen to
use the power of their nations to balance that of other
nations, or the balance may operate as a natural course of
events. ^

When such a system is in operation, it would

provide a natural incentive for nations to uphold
neutralization agreements as well as other agreements

^Inle Claude, Power And International Relations.
(New York:Random House, 1 962 ), pp. 20-24.
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providing international order.

Conversely, the

neutralization agreement can reinforce the balance of
power system when guaranteeing nations use their power
to stop violations.
Greene claims that neutralization is 11limited to
situations in which a rough balance of power prevails*1.
He sees the value of neutralization to be in the stabilizing
effect it has on the international system, and this effect
is judged by the contributions it makes toward maintaining
an equilibrium in the balance of power.

As examples he

notes that Switzerland and Belgium were neutralized to
contain the power of France which threatened to absorb
them, thereby preventing France from upsetting the balance
of power In Europe.

The crises which necessitated renewal

of Belgian neutrality were occasions when the balance of
power was threatened, and the renewal of the agreement
aided in protecting that balance.^

The neutralization

of Laos could be seen as a partially successful attempt
by the United States and the Soviet Union to set up a
balance of power in Southeast Asia.

As noted earlier in

this paper, a reason for the failure of that arrangement
is that Laos, being small and remote, has a smaller effect
on the balance of power between the major powers than did
Switzerland, Belgium, and the other European neutralized
nations•

^°Greene, pp. 1042-1044; Lyon, p. l64n; Black, p. 3 6 .
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The Princeton University study gives certain types
of areas suitable for neutralization and other types
which are unsuitable.

They eliminate as unsuitable those

areas where conflict is only internal, rather than between
the neutralizing powers and areas where there is no
territory in dispute.

Neutralization is most successful

where the neutralized territory has a capacity for selfgovernment, since this reduces the temptation for outside
powers to Intervene.

61

This supports my conclusion that

a strong stable government is needed.
They also argue that the sense of nationalism should
not be so strong that the neutralized nation would be un
willing to surrender some of its freedom of action, but
nationalism should be sufficiently strong to encourage
the nation to stand up in defense of its territory or its
independence.

A further obstacle could exist if the

neutralized nation would not accept a curtailment of its
participation in international collective security organi62
zatlons.
These factors provide some explanation as to why the
treaty neutralizing Laos was so much more detailed than
other cases and why, despite this detail, it was less
successful.

/^Black, p. 6 6 .
62 Black, pp. 66 ff., pp. I50 -I5 1 .

A closer look at Laos provides some other reasons
for failure.

One obvious characteristic of the situation

in Laos is that it was more complicated, with many more
nations being Involved.
throughout the world.
its success.

Those nations were scattered
There were Immediate threats to

Most significantly, neutralization was part

of negotiations designed to prevent a major war which was
developing, whereas in Switzerland and Austria it took
place at the end of a war.

Consequently, in these other

cases, provisions forbidding hostilities and Intervention
in other nations had been settled by force and were contained
elsewhere in a peace treaty.

Even in Laos the removal of

foreign troops had been provided for in an earlier treaty,
the Geneva Convention of 1954, but that treaty had been
violated.

The neutralization agreement again called for

removal of troops, but it failed again.
The Princeton University study explains the differences
between these cases in another way.

It notes that

neutralization in Switzerland, Belgium and Luxembourg was
established and guaranteed by the same five powers, Inspired
and united by a common culture.

Even the four powers which

neutralized Austria, despite their ideological differences,
agreed that Austria should continue as a non-aligned state
after independence.

Laos was quite different because there

was no fundamental agreement between the neutralizing
states about principles and policies.

They Mwere all

more or less directly involved in the internal affairs
of Laos, and neutralization was proposed as a compromise
solution to a complex international dispute".^

63u.s, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
Neutralization in Southeast Asia, p. 21.
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GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

I have described the characteristics of
neutralization, its purposes, its results, and factors
which determine its success.

It would be useful at this

point to tie this material together and construct a
model of neutralization which could then be applied to
Israel, if it fits, or to other nations.

However, there

is no single model or typical situation, and the form
which neutralization takes depends upon the situation
within the neutralized nation and In the international
system.

For example, Switzerland was allowed military

forces to defend not only its Independence but also its
neutralized status.
militarized.

On the other hand Luxembourg was de

The success of Swiss neutralization was

due

in large part to Swiss determination to be neutral, while
Belgium was not Interested in neutrality.

Brief treaties

were sufficient for neutralization in Europe, but even an
elaborate treaty was not sufficient in Laos.

Austrian

neutralization was established on the undetailed model of
Switzerland, according to the Soviet Union, while the Princeton
University study for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
produced an elaborate model similar to the agreement for Laos for
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possible application in Vietnam.

These two models are

very different from each other.

Certain analogies can be

seen between the situation in Israel and in other
neutralized nations, but using any of those situations as
a model for Israel would require exaggerating the analogies
and would result In the conclusion that there is little or
no application in Israel.

Consequently, I will only state

some conclusions and generalizations in summary for use as
a basis for an application to Israel.
First, the essential purpose for neutralization is to
Isolate local conflict from major power rivalries.

In

addition, as a practical matter, local conflict should
first be settled by separate means and a balance of power
established before neutralization is attempted.

This

Includes settling disputes with neighboring nations as
well as establishing a stable government within the
neutralized country which will persist in maintaining a
neutral policy.

This neutral policy refers to its attitude

toward great power hostilities or Cold War rivalries.

It

does not mean neutrality with respect to antagonisms it
has with its neighbors, although as stated above any
disputes resulting from such antagonisms should be settled
in some way.

If these disputes are not settled, the major

powers will always be tempted to Intervene.

Neutralization

cannot be expected to be a cure for deep ideological
conflicts, involving either the great powers, the
neutralized nation, or its neighbors.
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Secondly, neutralization must suit the national
interests of all participants; that is, all nations
capable of disrupting the status.

And thirdly,

neutralization guarantees the independence and territorial
integrity of the neutralized nation.

And beyond these

three accomplishments, extra benefits may result.
The only requirements for the process of establishing
neutralization are a statement of intention to follow a
neutral policy, made by the neutralized nation, and some
sort of agreement, preferably formal, between the great
powers and certain other nations not to violate that
nation's independence and neutrality.

Additional treaty

details and enforcement machinery may be provided as
Incentives to comply with these commitments.

Logically,

the more of these extra provisions which are added, the
more likely will be the chance of success.
With the scope of neutralization thus reduced to Its
essentials, an application may be attempted.

Perhaps it

would successfully accomplish its basic purposes.

If it

falls to do this, the attempt may still be worthwhile.
After all, “permanence" signifies a long time, and if
neutrality Is maintained only through a period during
which a balance of power prevails, that Is until future
events upset that balance and a new balance comes about,
it will have served a constructive purpose at least
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temporarily.

And even if it fails, there may be sufficient

benefits to warrant the attempt to establish it.

In Laos,

for example, the alternative to the neutralization agreement
which was continuously violated would probably have been
warfare similar to that which has been taking place in
neighboring Vietnam.
It should also be realized that some unfavorable
results are Inevitable In any neutralization situation.
This is especially true regarding the neutralized nation
since it has to accept certain restrictions on Its freedom
of aotion.
In recent years there has been a revival of Interest
in neutralization.

The attitude of world leaders toward

it is bound to have an effect on whether they would be
Interested in using it.

There is Increasing disillusion

ment toward some of the customary devices for maintaining
international security.

Collective security arrangements

have failed to prevent the two World Wars and many other
cases of aggression.

Partition of Germany, Korea and

Vietnam as a method to remove them from international..
conflict has only resulted in permanent confrontation.
64
An alternative to those devices is being sought.
Neutralization could provide that alternative.
This interest in neutralization may be seen first in
the rise of neutralism in the Third World, which has
finally received acceptance by the major powers.

Many of

^Charles Yost, “Israel And The Arabs, the Myths That
Block Peace11, Atlantic. Jan. 1969, p. 80.
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these new states did not want to take sides in the Cold
War because they were too preoccupied with their own
internal development.

They resisted attempts by the

major powers to align them into their respective blocs.
During the early 1 9 5 0 's there was some favorable feeling
within France toward the doctrine of neutralism; but as
noted previously, these neutralist nations were not
interested in neutralism.

By the end of that decade,

the major powers had accepted the strength of neutralist
feeling in the Third World nations in spite of their
efforts to align them, and in some cases even encouraged
65
it.
Soviet acceptance of neutralism was illustrated
first by Its one-sided neutralization of Finland in 1948
and then by the initiative it took to neutralize Austria
in 1955.
Growing American interest was illustrated in the
transition from absence of response to Finland's neutrali
zation, to mild response to Austria's neutralization, and
finally to taking the initiative in neutralizing Laos, In
1962.

The Laos case was the only time It was officially

advocated as American policy and therefore cannot be taken
as an indication of wide American approval.
Various Americans have shown Interest toward
neutralization as a possible solution to the Vietnamese
dilemma.

For example, such proposals have been made by

65Lyon, Neutralism, pp. 19-20*
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George Romney and George Kennan.^

The U. S. 3enate

Foreign Relations Committee study referred to in this
paper was the basis for a suggestion made by that committee
that neutralization be considered by the President for
Vietnam.

It is thus evident that there is a growing

willingness to consider neutralization by both the major
and minor nations of the world.

Certainly this willing

ness would be a factor in favor of its success if It is
to be used.
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Black, p. v.

CHAPTER IV
APPLICATION IN ISRAEL

I have chosen Israel as a prospective subject for
neutralization for several reasons.

The United States

and the Soviet Union have become increasingly Involved
in the Arab—Israeli conflict.

There is serious concern

that if war should break out there again as it did in
1956 and 1967 , the major powers might be drawn in, and

the situation could develop into a world war.

This in

creasing Involvement is similar in many ways to the
events which led up to the neutralization of Laos in
1962 .

Some of the proposals which have been made by

the major powers to negotiate clashing Interests in the
Middle East, to supervise the cease fire, and to reduce
their involvement have characteristics in common with
the neutralization process.
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EFFECTS ON INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

We have seen that neutralization must, by definition,
accomplish certain ends, and that it often has other results,
some desirable and some not.

With this in mind, we can

select some objectives which might be appropriate for
Israel.

There are two main objectives: to guarantee the

survival of Israel and to isolate the Arab-Ieraeli conflict
from the Cold War.
These two main objectives are critical.

The question

of Israel*s existence is the basic issue from which the
other issues in the Arab-Israeli conflict have developed.
Settling it would therefore reduce most of the contention
between Israel and the Arab nations, and also reduce con
frontation between the Cold War rivals which have become
involved by taking sides over the question of Israelis
existence.
The Increasing involvement by each of the two major
Cold War powers has been largely in response to activities
of the other power.

Soviet missiles are being Installed

in Egypt for defense against American aircraft sold to
Israel, while additional aircraft are being provided to

9k

balance this increase in military strength which the
missiles give to Egypt.

This arms race corresponds to

the escalation of aid to opposing factions in Laos which
had been drawing the two powers closer to war until It
was stopped by the neutralization agreement there.

Even

if the local Issues are not settled to the satisfaction
of all and a war breaks out again in the Middle East, a
neutralization agreement, if obeyed by the Gold War powers,
would guarantee that they would not be drawn Into the war.
There are other broad objectives which would be In
the interest of the Middle East nations and the Cold War
powers.

For example, neutralization would reduce the

costly and dangerous arms race, permitting diversion of
. resources to economic development.

It might provide

enough stability to reopen the Suez Canal permanently.
It could promote the sharing of the area*s resources by
the U.S., U.S.S.R. and Europe, if provisions are added to
extend neutralization to other parts of the area.
This suggestion to extend the neutralized area beyond
Israel raises an important question which will have to be
answered; that Is, Just what the neutralized area should
be.

There are several reasons why an area larger than

Israel might be preferred.

For example, isolation of the

Arab-Israell conflict from the Cold War might be accom
plished by neutralizing the Middle East area, or by

separate neutralizing actions for each of the Middle
East nations involved.

It will be seen that while

application to a wider area seems preferable in the
perspective of the international situation, it is not
very satisfactory from the point of view of the
neutralized nation or nations.

These points will be

brought out as the purposes of neutralization are
further explained, showing that the neutralized area
should be Israel, and that the neighboring states would
not be neutralized but would have to accept some
restrictions.
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ISSUES TO BE SETTLED

We should not assume that neutralization would bring
peace to the area.

As I have stated, neutralization will

not settle Ideological conflicts.

It would not be expected

to stop the Soviet campaign to extend communism into the
Middle East and Africa, nor the American effort to block
it.

And it would not end the desire of the Arab nations

to regain territory taken by Israel, nor the Israeli desire
to defend Itself from Its neighbors.

Therefore, before

neutralization could be erpected to contribute to any
sharing or cooperation in the 241ddle East, the issues
behind the conflicts would have to be settled by other
means first.

Without such a settlement, a fiasco of

continued violations would be likely to occur as it has
in Laos.

Even In Laos the neutralization agreement was

accompanied by reaffirmation of the principles agreed to
at the 1954 Geneva Convention, which was supposed to
establish a stable condition there.

The Issues might be
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settled in a separate agreement,_or neutralization might
be a part of a larger peace treaty.

Neutralization would

then be a way of stabilizing the situation and maintaining
the balance of power once it has been established.
Before going further into the purposes of neutralization
of Israel, let us see what these issues are, which must be
settled.

The principle issues are: (1) the existence of

Israel; (2) Israel*s boundaries; (3) navigation rights for
Israel; (4) the status of Palestinian Arabs, especially
the refugees; (5) the status of Jerusalem; and (6) a
permanent truce or peace treaty.
Israel*s neighboring nations and the displaced
Palestinian Arabs have not recognized Israel*s existence
as a nation.

Instead, they claim that the country belongs

to the Arabs who lived there in what had been Palestine
before the influx of the Jews who built Israel.

Their

stated objective is to eliminate Israel, although Israel
is recognized by the principal nations of the world,
including the Soviet Union and the United States.

This

dispute is based not only on legal rights to land taken
by Israel, but also on strong religious beliefs surviving
for thousands of years.

God, through Abraham, promised
6?
the land to the nation formed by his descendents. Both
the Jews and the Arabs are descended from Abraham, and

both claim this land.

^Genesis 15 J18.
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Neutralization of Israel would guarantee its existence
and independence, and a prerequisite would therefore be for
the Arab nations to recognize Israel and stop threatening
to "push Israel into the sea".

This guarantee would be a

great benefit to Israel and an incentive for Israel to
submit to neutralization.

Along with recognized Independence

would come the benefits of increased security and reduced
defense costs.
For the Arab nations and the displaced Palestinians,
this recognition of Israel would be a concession which
they would not want to make unless compensated by other
benefits.

Arab national leaders have hinted recently that

they would be willing to accept Israel*s existence in ex
change for Israeli concessions, so this would not be too
great an obstacle for them.

However, some Palestinian

leaders are not so willing to make such concessions.
Neutralization of these neighboring Arab states to
guarantee their independence Is almost pointless, since
the independence of those nations is not in Jeopardy.
This is one reason for neutralizing only Israel, rather
than a larger area In the Middle East.
In addition to the question of Israel*s existence,
there is a boundary dispute.

During the wars which have

taken place between Israel and its neighbors, Israel has
expanded and annexed territory.

Most of this territory
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has little intrinsic value but has strategic value for
Israeli's defense.

There have been several shifts of

boundaries through these years and little legal basis
for any of them.

The original boundaries were prescribed

by the United Nations General Assembly in 19^7 at the
request of the United Kingdom when Israel was granted its
Independence.

This decision divided the land between

Israel and Palestine, but neither of them agreed to the
boundaries, and Palestine was never established as a state.
Those boundaries chopped the land into small Indefensible
parts, and it is now agreed by all concerned that whatever
the final boundaries are, they should be defensible.
Israel has not stated what it believes its boundaries
should be, except that they be defensible.

Egypt*s

boundary claim Is that Israel should give back all land
taken from its neighbors, ivhich is sometimes interpreted
to mean the entire country, and sometimes only the portion
taken in 1967 .

The boundary with Jordan is also undefined

and is complicated by the conflict over possession of and
access to Jerusalem.

This boundary question would have to

be settled since neutralization means that once boundaries
are agreed to, they cannot be changed except by mutual
agreement.

Lauterpacht specifically Includes in his

requisites for neutralization that a neutralized state
may not "cede a part of its territory nor acquire more
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without the consent of the guaranteeing states'*.
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Accordingly, neutralization would remove one of the
greatest sources of conflict in the area.

Border clashes

have been a constant annoyance to both sides.
Without neutralization guarantees, a border settle
ment would no more be able to prevent future border clashes
than previous settlements have prevented them in the past.
For the Arab nations, it would mean giving up efforts to
regain lost territory, except that gained through the peace
treaty negotiations.

For Israel, there could be no further

expansion and no further pre-emptive attacks to prevent
Arab invasion.

Neither side could attack fortifications

erected on the other side of the border.

This restriction

would be seen by Israel as accepting a serious risk, since
guns in Egypt or Jordan can reach targets in the heart of
Israel.
Since previous settlements included United Nations
observers and American guarantees, history shows that
there is no assurance that even a neutralization agreement
would prevent future border conflicts.

Furthermore, if

each nation whose borders are affected knows that it will
not be able to alter them, except by an unlikely amendment
to the treaty, they would be more reluctant to accept any
boundary agreement at all.

For example, Israel might be

^Lauterpacht, Vol. II, p. 244.
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willing to give up Sharm el Sheikh, but would want to be
able to reoccupy It if denied navigation rights in the
Gulf of Aqaba as it was in 196?.
These problems can be overcome by neutralization only
if guarantees are more positive, stronger, and more con
vincing than previous guarantees.

They should be strong

enough to assure each side that the other would not violate
the agreement.

Threatening weapons along the borders would

have to be removed permanently.
A boundary settlement stabilized by neutralization
would benefit both Israel and its neighbors by providing
security and contributing to an atmosphere in which diatruat and retaliation might eventually be replaced by
mutual acceptance and cooperation.

It would then remove

the threat to the Arab states against Israeli expansion,
and Israel would no longer be threatened by loss of its
territory.
Neutralization of Egypt, Syria and Jordan Individually
would further guarantee those borders.

However, if a

single neutralization of the entire area is attempted, a
serious problem arises.

In that case, there would be no

guarantee of borders within the area at all.

The only

requirement would be that the big powers stay out of any
future border dispute and let the local states settle the
matter themselves.
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Another issue is navigational rights for Israel in
the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba.

It has been the

policy of Egypt to deny Israel the use of the Suez Canal, and
the attempt to close access to the Gulf of Aqaba to
was one of the events which set off the six-day

Israel

war in 1967 .

This has been a form of economic warfare, of a type which
could be prohibited by a neutralization agreement.

A

possible solution would be to neutralize or internationalize
these waterways to guarantee their use to all nations.
However, this would not seem to be necessary, and Egypt
would not want

to be denied revenue charged for

the canal.

would

It

use of

be sufficient only to open the canal

and to permit Israel to use both waterways.

This could be

done in the peace treaty and would not need to be repeated
in the neutralization agreement.
The status of the Palestinian Arabs is complex.

Some

parallels can be made with the Pathet Lao in Laos and
perhaps with the revolutionary elements which appeared
in Switzerland in 1847.

In each case, these groups were

disloyal to the established government.

They wanted to

establish rule over part or all of the territory of the
nation, and they had strong ties with neighboring nations,
These ties meant that they opposed neutrality.

The havoc

created by the Pathet Lao serves as a warning that the
Palestinians could wreck Israeli neutrality.

However, each

situation had its unique characteristics, and conclusions
based on events in one case may not necessarily apply to
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another.
The Palestinian Arabs consist of those who fled from
their homeland (mostly during and soon after the wars of
1947-1948 and of 1 9 6 7 ) and those who remained.

About

700.000 refugees fled in the first of those wars, and there

were almost 700,000 refugees again in 1967 , nearly half of
whom were the same refugees moving a second time.

About

200.000 of the first group settled in the Gaza strip,
originally under Egyptian administration, then under United
Nations administration, and now under Israeli occupation.
They constitute most of the population of that area, with
many still living in refugee camps.

Most of the remainder

of the first group of refugees, nearly 5 0 0 ,000 , settled In
the west bank area of Jordan.

In 19&7 about half fled across

the Jordan River, still in Jordanian territory.

Some

estimateb claim that refugees now make up as much as two-*
thirds of the population of that part of Jordan not
occupied by Israel, and they are a source of turmoil and
political instability.
In Syria and Lebanon their numbers are not great enough
to cause a settlement problem, but dissatisfied radicals
among them stir up demonstrations and riots to keep alive
the issue of returning to Palestine.

In 19^7 still another

350.000 refugees fled across the Suez Canal into Egypt from
the Sinai Peninsula and Suez Canal zone.

Most refugees in
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all of these areas consider their present locations to be
temporary, until they can return to Palestine.

Their

terrorist activities of 1970 , including the hijacking and
destruction of foreign commercial aircraft, and civil war
in Jordan, have been reminders that they do not intend to
be Ignored in any peace settlement.
In addition to these refugees In Arab countries, many
Palestinian Arabs remain under Israeli rule.

After 1948

about 200,000 Arabs remained behind, making up about 9% of
the population of Israel.

Since the occupation of Sinai,

Gaza, and the Jordanian west bank in 1967, this number has
increased to about one million, about half of which were
previously classified as refugees from the 1947-1948 war.
Their numbers are now sufficient to cause the Israeli
government a considerable administrative burden and a
political threat.
Various solutions to their problems have been tried
and others proposed.

The U. N. has provided food, shelter,

and education to an Increasing number of these refugees,
numbering nearly a million.

This is Intended to be a

o- -

temporary measure, but is self-perpetuating.

Even if

they were to return to their original homes, Israel has
changed so much that this would not solve their problems.
Furthermore, Israel resists their repatriation.

Compen

sation for their loss has been considered, with permanent

105
settlement somewhere else.

However, permanent settlement

elsewhere has been resisted by the Arab nations because
It would be an acknowledgement that Israel was there to
stay.

Israel has made efforts to Integrate Arabs living

there into the nation, and they have been given political
rights, but the Arabs are at a disadvantage still because
they are a religious, linguistic and ethnic minority.

In

short, these Palestinian Arabs within and outside of Israel
6q
consider themselves a people without a country. 7
The future status of all these Palestinlnan Arabs is
not a matter to be settled by a neutralization agreement,
but it can have effects on such an agreement.

If the dis

satisfied refugees are permanently settled in Egypt, Jordan,
Syria and Lebanon, they would be in a position to disrupt
neutralization and the balance of power being maintained
in the area*

They and the Israeli Arabs might resume

guerrilla warfare which would then tend to draw Israel
and the Arab nations back into conflict in the same way
that North Vietnam and the Pathet Lao have disrupted
neutralization in Laos.

Neutralization is seriously

threatened when a faction exists which is not sympathetic
to It and can disrupt It.

It would be the responsibility

of Israel to keep its Arabs under control or bring their
69

Don Peretz, Israel and The Palestine Arabs.
(Washington:Middle East Institute, 1958), p. 3?
pp. 19-21; Don Peretz, "Israel's New Arab Dilemma",
Middle East Journal, Winter. 1968, pp. 45—49;
Time. June 22, 1970, p. 22.
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representatIves to the negotiations.

The Palestinian

Arabs^in the. neighboring nations would be controlled by
their host governments; or, if they would not submit,
they would be treated equally with the Arab nations
regardless of whether their ultimate status Is a state
of their own or they become permanent citizens of existing
states.

If they continue to be scattered in several

states, they might be represented by leaders from each
-faction.

The consent of the opposition party in Austria

to neutralization negotiations with Austria provides a
precedent.
The main interest of the dissatisfied Palestinians
has been to regain their lost homes, and it is not likely
that neutralization would satisfy that hope.

Perhaps

their cooperation would be secured if they realize that
their future hopes lie in building a future for themselves
wherever they are now living, and that Israel is here to
stay. .
Next is the issue of Jerusalem, which both Israel
and Jordan claim.
years.

Its status has shifted through the

By the United Nations General Assembly decision

of 1947, it was to be administered by the United Nations;
but before that administration could be set up, it was
occupied and divided In the war between Israel and Jordan.
The dispute over the city is rooted In deep religious
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tradition for both Jews and Arabs, as well as Christians.
The status of Jerusalem may be treated as an especially
critical part of the boundary question.

Its status would

be settled separately from neutralization, but any attempt
to change its status, other than by mutual agreement, would
violate neutralization and would Invite enforcement
sanctions.

Another way to treat Jerusalem Is to consider

It as a suitable object for neutralization following the
precedent of the 1947 United Nations decision.
As the final issue, a permanent cease fire or peace
treaty would be necessary since Israel cannot be expected
to be neutral while at war.

Again, the Important point is

that the neutralization agreement would not bring about
the cease fire, but would follow it and help to maintain
it by stabilizing the situation.

A temporary cease fire

is in effect at the time of this writing.
to be made permanent.

It would have

A peace settlement is required not

to meet the terms of the definition of neutralization but
as a practical prerequisite, as explained in chapter two.
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EFFECTS ON ISRAEL

We have seen that neutralization would guarantee
Israel its existence, independence and territorial
integrity.

This means that the Arab nations would

have to end their goal of eliminating Israel and
recognize its permanent existence.

It also means that

'those neighboring nations would have to give up efforts
to regain lost territory.

Israel's willingness to accept

neutralization would depend on its satisfaction with terms
of the separate peace settlement,
more secure.

Israel would be much

The heavy expense of providing for its

national defense would be reduced, and more national
effort could be devoted to Internal development.
What other effects would neutralization have on
Israel?

Its national Interests are primarily

providing security and Internal development;

those of
Israel is

not particularly interested in taking sides In the Cold
War ercept when the Cold War affects the Arab-Israeli
conflict.

Israel has no mutual defense agreements.

Samuel Merlin observed that Israel is a nation without
sillies. It has friends, but not allies committed to fight
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for its defense.^-0

Even the United States, for all its

aid, opposed Israel during its wars and put the greatest
pressure on Israel to give up captured Egyptian territories
in 1956.

Consequently, the idea that neutralization Imposes

on Israel the obligation to be neutral with regard to the
Cold War or to open hostilities between the major powers
poses no problem.

Israel has not been very active in the

United Nations and has received little sympathy from that
organization, and therefore would not be upset by
restrictions against membership and participation in inter
national organizations.

Israeli nationalism is strong, and

Israel is not likely to be pleased to give up any of its
independence and freedom of action by taking on the treaty
obligations of a neutralization treaty.

The usual case

for neutralized nations is that this loss is compensated
for by other gains, such as a guarantee of territorial
Integrity and survival.

For Israel, it might be worth

this sacrifice to be free of setbacks and threats of
attacks from its neighbors.
Although Israel would have no formal commitments to
break in order to accept neutralization, it does receive
military aid.

For example, in 1969 and 1970 the United

States provided $500 million in special military sales
credits to be used to meet Israel's purchase obligations

^Samuel Merlin, The Big Powers And The Present Crisis
In The Middle East: A Colloquium. (leaneck;FalrlelKh
Dicklnson Univ. Press, 1 96 8 ), p . 8 5 .
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made during 1970*
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Neutralization would cut off this

aid, but presumably the need for it also.
Israel's greatest objection to neutralization would
probably be its unwillingness to trust the other members
to comply, no matter how strong the guarantees might be.
In 1956 Israel withdrew from territory gained in the war
that year, with promises from the United States and the
United Nations that those boundaries would be guaranteed;
but those promises were not honored in I9 67 .

Consequently,

Israel is skeptical about trusting any such guarantees
again.

Also, Israel does not want foreign troops on its

territory for enforcement or any other purpose, but prefers
to rely on Its own people.
Israeli public support for neutralization would
probably not be a problem as long as the Israeli government
agreed to it.

The government is sufficiently stable and

popular that Its policies would be supported, with mild
dissent from militants who would prefer to rely on military
power.

Israel would still be able and expected to maintain

its military forces for defense.

The government forces

could detect violations within its borders and deal with
them without need for outside help.
situation in Israel is much

In this respect, the

more favorable than in Laos.

^Department of State, United States Foreign Policy
1969 -1970 , (Washington: U.S.Government Printing
Office, 1971), p. 79.
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effects on the bio powers

r Having considered the effects of neutralization on
xfche Middle East conflict and on Israel, let us now turn
to_ the big powers to see how neutralization would affect
their Interests in the Middle East,
t: c. In addition to matters of local conflict to be
^settled, there is the conflict between the major powers.
Neutralizations in Europe were accompanied by other
negotiations which ended conflict between the major
powers there.

On the other hand, the United States,

Soviet Union and China did not settle their conflict
over Southeast Asia prior to neutralization, and consequent
continuing rivalry was a cause of failure there.

If this

means that an end of Cold War rivalry is a prerequisite
for neutralization in Israel, then prospects for its
success would seem to be hopeless.

Yet the peace treaties

in Europe did not end rivalries there, but rather ended
conflict by establishing a balance of power.

Therefore,

if the United States and the Soviet Union cannot agree to
end their rivalry, the establishment of a balance of power
between them would be sufficient.

Both powers would wish

to protect the balance by neutralizing the central problem Israel.
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The United States and the Soviet Union have made some
efforts to establish a balance of power in the Middle East.
For example, President Nixon warned in a television inter
view on July 1, 1970, that “it is in the United States1
interests to maintain the balance of power, and we will
72

maintain that balance of power*1.

This statement was

made after reports of clashes between Israeli and Soviet
pilots over the Suez Ganal.

This argument has been used

to justify the sale of American fighter aircraft to Israel,
to balance the supply of Soviet missiles to Egypt.

Actually,

President Nixon is not so interested in an equal balance
of power as in making sure that the balance does not favor
Egypt and the Soviet Union.

At a Los Angeles news conference

of July 27, 1970> President Nixon made the same point by
warning that when "the balance of power shifts where
Israel is weaker than its neighbors, there will be war".
On the other hand, the Soviet Union has been trying
to build up Egypt to create a balance of power which does
not favor Israel.

Thus, a situation exists conducive to
*
\
an arms race and further conflict as each tries to create

its version of a balance of power.

If at somevpoint the

two powers accept the situation as an acceptable balance
which would thereafter be maintained at that level,
neutralization could then be used to maintain it.

The

"^Quoted in Department of State Bulletin, July 27> 1970,
p. 113 .
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balance of power there would serve two purposes.

For

the big powers, it would prevent the other from gaining
the upper hand.

For the international community, it

would provide stability.
While it is important to have a balance of power
between the big powers, it is also Important that any
neutralization plan be compatible with their individual
Interests in the Middle East.

These interests must then

be examined.
Soviet interests in Israel and the Middle East are a
continuation of the traditional Russian quest for outlets
to the sea and access to the Indian Ocean.

In the past,

Russia was opposed there by Britain, and recently by the
United States.

By supporting Egypt and the other Arab

nations in their conflict with Israel, the Soviet Union
has put some of those nations In the position of depending
on Soviet aid as their only hope

to overcome Israel.

In

return, the Soviet Union hopes to gain privileges long
denied, by which it could secure access to the Indian
Ocean, the opening of ports to Soviet shipping, and
generally extend its influence into southern Asia and
eastern Africa.

The Soviet Union is Interested in opening

the Suez Canal to its ships.

It has little direct interest

In Israel, but can use the conflict to Its advantage.
There is also some interest in extending communism into
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the Middle Eastern nations, but this Ideological objective
appears to be secondary to the national Interests mentioned
above.

Finally, the Soviet Union also alms to counter

American naval power and economic Influence in the area.
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Neutralization of Israel would not fit many of these
Soviet interests.

3y providing security for Israel, it

would also remove Israel as a threat to Egypt, which
would then no longer need Soviet aid for its defense.
The Soviet Union would therefore lose Influence In the
Middle East, and possibly lose some privileges it has
gained in Indian Ocean ports.

If Egypt were to be

Included with Israel as a neutralized nation, this would
result In an even greater loss of Soviet Influence there.
I explained that neutralization has been part of the
Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence to encourage Third
World nations to break ties with Western nations.

This

policy would not have much significance for Israel since
the Soviet Union has not shown much concern over Israel’s
alignment.

As for the Arab nation^ most of them have

already adopted neutral positions.

For example, Egypt

*^For Soviet Interests in the Middle East, see:.
Arnold L. Horellck, "Soviet Policy Dilemmas In The
Middle East", pp. 54-62, and Nasrollah S. Fatemi,
"The Present Crisis In The Middle East", pp. 27—33,
both in The 31g Powers And The Middle East,
Samuel Merlin, ed. ;
Philip E. Mosely, "Soviet Search For Security",
p. 21bff, in Soviet-American Rivalry In The Middle
East, Jacob C. Hurewitz, ed. (New York: Praeger,
1955)-;
Benjamin Shwadran, "The Soviet Hole In The Middle
East", Current History, Jan. 1971, P- 13ff;.'
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responded to Soviet promotion of neutralism with what
President Nasser called "positive neutralism".

By this

term, he meant freedom to accept aid from either side or
both sides in the Cold War, depending on what source of
aid would benefit Egypt the most, but without alignment
to Its benefactor.

Recently, Egypt has shifted toward

increasing commitments to the Soviet Union, some of which
would have to be broken if Egypt were to be neutralized
along with Israel.
Soviet interest in neutralization would therefore
not be derived from that nation's special Interests, but
from those Interests which It shares with other powers:
use of the Suez Canal, sharing resources, avoiding war,
and maintaining the balance of power.
American interests in the Middle East have a fairly
recent beginning.

They are partly economic, especially the

protection of oil investments and supplies.

However,

American Interests are more political, military and cultural
than economic.

An Important political and military

objective is to prevent the Soviet Union from becoming
the dominant power in the area.

There is a strong cultural

tie between many American Jews and Israel, and American
political leaders are subject to great domestic pressures
to support Israel.

The United States also supports peace

ful settlement of the conflicts there, and encourages
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permanently peaceful relations and International stability.
Neutralization of Israel alone, or with the rest of
the Middle East, would serve all of these American interests.
It would hinder Soviet domination of the area.

It would

provide a way to pursue the policy proposed by President
Nixon in his 1971 report to Congress, without resorting
to military power.

He said, “Any effort by any major

power to secure a dominant position could exacerbate
local disputes, affect Europe*s security, and increase
the danger to world peace.

We seek no such position; we

cannot allow others to establish one.

We believe that the

stability of the Middle East requires establishing a
balance in the activities of the various outside powers
involved there.

Each must be free to pursue its own

legitimate interests, but within the limits imposed by
respect for the legitimate interests of others and the
75
sovereignty of the nations of the area*1.
Furthermore,
neutralization would satisfy the political demands of
American Jews for support of Israel.

7kFor American policy in the Middle East, see:
Samuel Merlin, The Big Powers and The iMlddle East,
various pages;
John C. Campbell, “The Arab-Israeli Conflict: An
American PoUcy", Foreign Affairs, Oct. 1970, p. 51ff;
John C. Campbell, “American Search For Partners*', in
Sovlet-Amerlcan Rivalry, Jacob C. Hurewitz, ed.
p. 199ff;
Bernard Reich, “United States Policy in The Middle
East". Current History, Jan. 1971, PP* 1-12.
'^Richard Nixon, “U.S. Foreign Policy For the 19701s,
Building For Peace", Department of State Bulletin.
Mar. 22, 1971, p. 392.
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EFFECTS ON ISRAEL1S NEIGHBORS

There are other external nations whose interests
must be considered.

The neighboring states have so far

been discussed as possible objects of neutralization.
But they would also function as external nations in regard
to the neutralization of Israel.
Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon.

The nations would be
All are at war with

Israel and threaten to Invade it if they can build up
their strength enough to believe they can succeed in
defeating Israel.

Their Interests there are to regain

their lost territory and provide security against attacks
from Israel.

They are also Interested in a settlement of

the Palestinian Arab problem in a way that would satisfy
the Palestinians because the radical Palestinian leaders
are a continuing source of harassment until this is done.
This is especially important to Jordan where the
Palestinians are a serious threat to the political
stability of that country.
For these nations, the neutralization of Israel would
have the desired effect of stopping American military aid
to Israel.

It would provide security against threats of
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Israeli attacks; and decreasing the probability of war
would be a benefit.
stability.

Jordan could expect to gain internal

In the case of all these nations, the greatest

objections would be the requirement to accept the permanent
existence of Israel and the loss of opportunity to regain
territory*

Success would depend strongly on whether they

are satisfied with the terms of the separate peace settle
ment.
n£

Israel and the United States would Insist on an end

to Soviet military aid to Egypt to balance its own loss of
American aid.

This would then create an objection by the

Arab states to the whole arrangement.

It would not be

entirely a disadvantage though because it would release
Egypt from its growing dependency on the Soviet Union.
This need to end Soviet military aid Is a strong
argument in favor of neutralizing the whole area instead
of only Israel.

Since other problems would be generated

by neutralizing an area containing several nations, some
other way of accomplishing the same result is preferred.
At this point, it is clear that some restrictions must be
Imposed on the Arab nations to balance those Imposed on
Israel, but how this is to be done remains to be determined.
We will now attempt to do this.
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SELECTION OF AREA TO BE NEUTRALIZED

In this discussion, I have argued that Israel should
be neutralized, and that perhaps other Middle East nations
should be Included either collectively or separately.

We

may now decide what should be done about including these
other nations.

Neutralizing only Israel provides for its

Independence and territorial Integrity.

However, that

does not require the Arab states to make concessions to
balance the sacrifice required of Israel; nor does it
require Soviet concessions to balance those required of
the United States.

Neutralization of the entire area would

effectively remove it from the Cold War but provides no
protection against strife between Israel and its neighbors;
and therefore, it would not prevent border clashes or
Invasion of one Middle East country by another.
only prevent Invasion by a big power.
to the prospects of local peace.

It would

It would not add

Furthermore, experience

shows that the neutralized area should be united
sufficiently to defend its neutrality, and this Is
certainly not the case In the Middle East.

Another alternative, separate neutralization of the
Arab states adjacent to Israel, would solve these problems.
However, their complete neutralization hardly seems
necessary since there is no need to guarantee their
independence, and their territorial integrity would
already be guaranteed by neutralization of Israel.
Neutralization of these Arab nations would also Impose un
necessary restrictions on them in matters not related to
Israel.

For example, these nations have experimented

with various confederations, the latest of which Joins
Egypt, Syria and Libya.

These arrangements would not be

permitted by a neutralized state, which is supposed to
retain and defend its independence.
-

Neutralization would also Interfere with Egypt*s ties

with the Organization of African States and with Moslem
nations beyond the Middle East.

Since the reason for

Including the Arab states is to require them to make
certain concessions, the most satisfactory solution would
be to simply impose those concessions as additional terms
of a treaty to neutralize Israel.

In other words, Israel

should be selected as the nation to be neutralized, with
the extra provision that some of the terms of the
neutralization treaty also apply to its neighbors.
Still another alternative might be considered.

The

area to be neutralized might be reduced from the entire
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country of Israel to only those areas under greatest
dispute.

Cities and other small areas have been neutral

ized in the past; for example, Cracow.

For that matter,

the Gaza strip was neutralized until the war of 1967 , and
an attempt was made to neutralize Jerusalem in 1948.

The

Gaza strip or some more habitable area could be set aside
again as a home for the Palestinian Arabs and neutralized.
John C. Campbell has recently proposed that U.S.
policy Include a wspecial International status for East
Jerusalem,... special status for the Gaza strip (for
example, under U.N. administration) for a period of about
ten years,...demilitarized zones on both sides of the
frontiers, (and) U.N. observers and peacekeeping forces
in all demilitarized zones, subject to withdrawal only
with the consent of the Security 'Council".

Such a

proposal certainly has merit, but it is quite different
from the subject of neutralizing Israel.

These areas would

be neutral with respect to the Middle East nations instead
of with respect to the Cold War powers.

The status of

these areas would be more effectively determined as part
of separate peace negotiations, although the observers
and peacekeeping forces suggested by Mr. Campbell would
come under the neutralization agreement.

^ J o h n 'C. ..Campbell-, “The Arab-Israeli Conflict: An
American Policy11, Foreign Affairs. Oct. 1970, p. 6 1.
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OTHER PARTICIPANTS

Other Arab nations which have been supporting
Israel’s neighbors should be included as external
participants if they are capable of disrupting neutraliza
tion, and likely to attempt it.

These nations would be

Iraq, Libya, Algeria, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, and possibly
others.

They would correspond to the minor European

nations which were left out of the treaties establishing
neutralization of Belgium and Luxembourg.

They would

probably not need to participate in the negotiations
since they would not be likely to threaten Israel if
the closer neighbors ended their hostility.

It would be

assumed that they would give their assent afterwards.
The expansion of Israel is not a direct threat to them,
nor would defeat of Israel be of direct benefit to them.
Their interests are derived primarily from loyalty to
their Arab allies.
Britain and France could participate because of their
national interests and their previous attempts to
stabilize the area.

Although their interests In the

Middle East have declined since the loss of their
empires, they still have economic Interests to protect,
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among which is access to oil resources.

These economic

interests lie beyond rather than in Israel.

While they

have been strongly dependent on use of the Suez Canal for
shipping, they have learned to live without it, especially
since many of the modern oil tankers are too large for the
canal.

These nations still need the canal to shorten the

shipping route to the Indian Ocean, although the detour
around Africa is not so long for them as it is for Soviet
shipping operating from Black Sea ports.
Both Britain and France had a previous commitment to
guarantee the independence of Israel through the tri
partite agreement of 1951 (the United States being the
third partner), but it became void when they withdrew
support from Israel after the 1956 invasion of Egypt,
Neither nation has much direct Interest in Israel, and
France, being located on the Mediterranean Sea, is shifting
its attention to improving relations with the African
nations across that sea.

For example, it cut off its

supply of aircraft to Israel and has supplied arms to
Libya despite the possibility that they may be used against
Israel.

For Britain and France^ neutralization would serve

to stabilize the area, thereby protecting economic
interests and peaceful relations with the Middle East
nations.

While they would be interested In assisting

in establishing neutralization

of Israel, they would

probably not be sufficiently interested to commit them*-
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selves to defend that status, especially since they were
rebuffed in 1956 by both the United States and the Soviet
Union for Joining Israel in the attack on Egypt in 1 9 5 6 * ^
Britain and France would not be essential to the
agreement, and many other nations in Europe and Asia have
similar Interests in the Middle East which are not
sufficient to Justify their inclusion.

The main reason

for their participation Is that their efforts in the
past have been helpful and they have offered to continue
these efforts.

As part of the "big four", they have been

negotiating through their foreign ministers and through
permanent representatives to the United Nations.
Count Reginald de Warren, Counsellor to the French Embassy
in Washington, in a lecture to the Hampton Roads World
Affairs Council on February 17, 1971, suggested that
France could assist by mediating between the United States
and Egypt since it retained diplomatic relations with
Egypt while the United States did not.

He also suggested

that France might help the U.S. and U.S.S.R. to overcome
the antagonisms and distrust which exist between them.
77

For British and French policy in the Middle East, see:
Benjamin Revlin, "The Big Fowers and The Middle
East", pp. 39-^6;
Samuel Merlin, "The Big Powers and Israel8, pp. 84-91
in The Big Powers And The Middle East.
.Samuel Merlin, ed.

To complete the list of participants, other nations
might take part for the purpose of providing enforcement
teams.

These could be several individual nations without

Interests in Israel, or they could be representatives of
an International body such as the United Nations.
A proposed list of participants in any neutralization
agreement would therefore be:
(1) the neutralized nation:
(2) the major powers:

Israel;

United States, Soviet Union,

Britain and France;
—

(3) neighbors:

Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon,

and perhaps Palestine;
(4) other minor nations which might have Interests
there:

probably none necessary;

perhaps Iraq,

Libya, Sudan, Algeria, Saudi Arabia;
(5) neutrals for enforcing purposes:

several

individual nations or United Nations representation.
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ACTIONS ALREADY TAKEN CONTEIBUTINO TO NEUTRALIZATION

An examination of the Joint efforts which have been
made by the major powers to negotiate their differences
in the Middle East may give an indication of whether a
neutralization agreement could be made and enforced.
There have been negotiations between the United States
and the Soviet Union, by the "big four", and by the
United Nations.
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These negotiations have intensified

Since the six-day war of 1967 .

First, the United Nations

Security Council agreed to a resolution in November, 196 ?.
Since both sides of the Cold War agreed to this resolution,
it indicates that there is common ground between these
factions which might progress toward further settlement.
Some features of this-resolution are steps toward
neutralization.

It provided for definite boundaries to

be recognized by all nations which would automatically
constitute recognition of Israel's existence as a nation
as well.
war.

The resolution also called for an end to the

It was very general in its terms, not identifying

the boundaries and not providing for any guarantees.

^Bernard Reich, "United States Policy In The Middle
East", Current KlBtory, January 19?1, pp. 3-5*.
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Since that resolution was passed, U. S./U.S.S.R. and
big four talks have used it as a basis for attempts to
reach further agreement.

From April to December, 1969 ,

bilateral talks were conducted between Mr. Sisco of the
United States and Mr* Dobrynin of the Soviet Union.

Their

objective was to "achieve parallel views which would
encourage the parties to work out a stable and equitable
79
solution^1
If these talks had been successful In
establishing such a common understanding, presumably the
two powers would have no further grounds for contention
over the Middle East, and this would then have removed
that area from Cold War rivalries, permitting the Middle
East nations to be neutral.
successful.

But these talks were not

They were helpful in promoting the July 1970

cease fire, and in the words of Secretary of State Rogers
they brought about a "measure of understanding, but very
substantial differences remain".

While these talks went

on, the situation actually became more polarized and less
"neutralized" as military support by each of the powers
increased in the form of Soviet missiles to Egypt and
American aircraft to Israel.
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William P. Rogers, "A Lasting Peace In The Middle
East: An American View", Department of State
Bulletin. Jan. 5> 1970, p. 8.
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The "big four" negotiations have had three purposes:
(1) to enable Ambassador Jarring to resume peace talks
between Israel and Egypt; (2) to arrange and extend the
cease fire; and (3) to find a peaceful solution on the
basis of the Security Council Resolution 242.80

The first

two of these objectives were short range goals which were
successfully achieved, but have little to do with
neutralization.

The third objective Is a continuation

of Security Council efforts discussed previously.
A new feature recently added to these negotiations
has been hints of four—power guarantees of whatever peace
settlement all parties might agree to.

This is a further

step toward neutralization since It would require cooperation
between the "big four" and would be impossible if AmericanSoviet contention continues in the area.

Secretary Rogers

indicated willingness to consider participation in
81
guarantees.
Senator Fulbrlght made a similar proposal
to Congress for American participation in a force acting
under United Nations authority to guarantee compliance
82
with a peace settlement.
80„
From statement of U.Thant, Oct. 23, 1970, quoted
in Norfolk Ledger Star. Oct. 24, 1970.
SlReport of Dec. -23, 1970 news conference In
Current History. Feb. 1971, p. 126.
J.W.Fulbrlght, "Old Myths And New Realities - II:
The Middle East", Congressional Record. Aug. 24, 1970,
S14023.
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Although neutralization is usually considered in
terms of major powers, we have seen that smaller powers
with Interests in the agreement are also likely to
participate.

Therefore, we should not overlook the

possibility of the neutralization agreement being
initiated by these smaller powers, followed by concurrence
of the major powers.

Thus far, there has been no

-initiative to build upon.

The Arab nations, especially

"Egypt, have been unwilling to negotiate directly with
Israel.
are slim.

Consequently, the prospects for this action
:

--

■
—

-' •
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-^NEUTRALIZATION TREATY

If Israel were neutralized, what would be the terms
of a neutralization treaty?
divided into three parts:

The proposed treaty can be
actions by external nations,

actions by Israel, and Joint actions.

The special

restrictions on Israel's neighbors, needed to balance
corresponding restrictions on Israel, are included with
actions by external nations and the Joint actions.

This

treaty would be negotiated after the six major issues
behind the local conflict are settled, and would be
supplementary to it for those nations which sign both
treaties.

It would be a formal treaty.

Negotiations

might proceed through several states; that Is, we could
expect separate meetings-between the "big four" and
between Arab nations, sometimes Including Palestinians,
to work out agreements in the most difficult areas of
contention, as is being done in the present negotiations.
The final agreement would be one to which all parties
would formally agree.

The following terms are proposed

based on the analysis of neutralization which I have
made in this study.

The external nations would agree

to the following terms:

131
-

1 Cl)

They will recognize the permanent existence,

independence, and territorial-integrity.of Israel.

They

will respect and observe that status for Israel in every
way.- They will refrain from all direct or indirect inter
ference in the internal affairs of Israel.
(2)

They will recognize Israel1s neutrality and

assist Israel to comply with the terms of this treaty.
(3)

They will respect the status of any other neutral

areas adjaoent to Israel as established by other treaty
(for example, Jerusalem, Gaza, or demilitarized zones).
(4)

They will engage in no military, economic,

political, or other alliance, the purpose of which is
hostile to the Interests of Israel.
; * (5)

They will remove all military personnel from

Israeli territory, including all civilian technicians,
advisors, and other personnel who are engaged In pro
viding military aid to Israel.

They will provide no

further military aid to Israel, but Israel may retain
all military equipment already purchased or otherwise
already promised by other nations.

They will not use

the territory of Israel for Interference in the internal
affairs of other countries.
(6)

They will engage in no military activity for

the purpose of preparing for offensive military action
against Israel.

Weapons along the borders capable of
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attacking Israel will be removed.

They will not use the

territory of any country, Including their own, to Inter
fere in the internal affairs of Israel.

They will not

provide further military aid to Arab nations for use
against Israel, nor will the Arab nations accept any
such aid.
(7)

They will engage In no treaty which would be

inconsistent with the neutrality of Israel.

They will

not attempt to Influence Israel to align itself with any
nation or bloc of nations against the Interests of another
nation or bloc of nations.
(8)

After complying with the terms of this treaty,

they will report this fact to the chairman (of the
conference negotiating this treaty) and will meet again
at his call.
(9)

In the event of a reported violation within the

territory of any party, that party will investigate the
violation in cooperation with the observation team, and
take action as necessary to stop the violation.

They

will permit Israel to participate in this Investigation.
(10)

Any member requested by Israel to assist Israel

to Investigate a violation will do so, along with any
other party wishing to join in the investigation.
(11)

They will Jointly defend the independence and

neutrality of Israel.

If unanimous agreement on Joint

action is not obtained within 72 hours after requesting
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a meeting, those parties which do agree on enforcement
action''will take action as necessary, except that
neither the United States nor the Soviet Union will take
such action without the concurrence of the other, and no
such action will be taken without permission of Israel.
Israel would agree to the following terms:
(1)

It declares its permanent neutrality with respect

to all warfare between other nations and neutralism with
respect to the Cold War.
(2)

— -

"••

~

•

It will not attempt to enlarge its borders

without the consent of the other signatories.
~ (3)

It will not Interfere in the internal affairs

of other nations nor permit Its territory to be used to
Interfere in the internal affairs of another nation.

It

will not permit foreign military bases on its territory.
(4)

It'will accept aid and engage in other relations

with other nations for the purpose of internal development
but not for use against other nations.

No aid will be

accepted in return for any political obligations.

It will

defend its Independence and territorial, integrity against
Interference or attack by any foreign country.

It will

remain armed for self defense.
(5)

It will respect the political rights of all

Palestinians residing in Israel.

All Palestinians residing

In Israel are subject to Israeli law.
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C6)

It will cooperate with the observation team

and provide that team with all information requested
regarding compliance withzthe terms of this treaty,
aw*„: (7 )

In;the event of violation within Israeli

territory, it will enforce its neutrality and independence
with all available means.

It will keep the observation

team Informed of the violation and actions taken, and
assist, the team In any investigation.

After investigation,

Israel-wili-either take:action-requested by the.observation
team or .request a meeting, of the parties of this treaty.
n=^: :.(8)

In the event Israel

suspects violation in

external territory, it.will immediately report the matter
tor the observation team and request Investigation.

In

case: of difference of opinion between Israe1 and the
Observation team, it will request a meeting of the
parties to this treaty for the purpose of restoring
neutralization.

-r:

_

(9? .It may continue its membership in the United
Nations so long as it is not required to Join in sanctions
against any other nation.
All parties would jointly agree to the following:
(l)

They will abide by the terms of any peace treaty

or armistice agreement made for the purpose of settling
the conflict between Israel and the Arab states.

This

requirement would apply to all parties to this
neutralization agreement, whether or not they were parties
to the peace treaty.
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.(2)

They will request the United Nations to provide

-airobservation team which will observe Implementation of
this treaty, investigate reports of violations, recommend
action by Israel and the suspected violator, and request
a meeting of this conference if action is not taken to
stop any violation.

If no such team is provided by the

United Nations, the parties will establish such a team
from their own resources, supplemented by members from
any other nation unanimously accepted by all parties.
They will provide the observation team with all resources
needed to carry out its duties.
(3)

They will reconvene within thirty days after

receiving notification from all parties that each has
complied with the terms of this treaty.

At that time,

any conflict in intrepretatlon of the meaning of the
terms of this treaty will be settled.

The treaty will

be declared to be in effect when all parties are satisfied
that all have complied and the observation team has been
established.
(4)

They will consult within 48 hours after receiving

a request for a meeting from the observation team, from
Israel, or from any other party.

Upon receiving a request

for action from the observation team, they will either
comply or request a meeting of the conference.
(5)

They will make no treaties or other commitments

by which Israel would be obligated In any way to support

any nation against another nation, nor which would make
Israel so economically dependent on any nation that its
neutrality would be impaired.

Trade relations with

Israel are unrestricted, except for those restrictions
specifically Imposed by this treaty.
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FINAL CONCLUSIONS

In this paper I have attempted to determine whether
neutralization would have an application to Israel, how
it would be established and maintained, what purposes It
would serve there, and what Its results would be.

I have

shown that it does have a theoretical application to
Israel.

The proposed treaty provides the mechanics of

Its establishment and maintenance.

Neutralization as

applied elsewhere has been modified in that proposal to
make it acceptable to all parties and conform to their
interests as well as to international stability.

Some

of the items would undoubtedly have to be compromised
in order to reach agreement.

The agreement would meet

enough common and individual national interests to
benefit them all, if they can accept the risks and
obstacles which cannot be eliminated.

I have not proven

whether neutralization would be successful.

Success in

this instance is relative to what is expected.

It would

achieve some goals and not others, as I have discussed.
I have also not proven whether neutralization will endure,
but have only pointed out that there are factors in favor
of and against its endurance.

A better measure of its

worth would be to compare it with the alternative of no

138
neutralization.

Without such an agreement to stabilize

the balance of power, any peace settlement would be no
more secure than previous settlements.

One analysis of

current developments in-the Middle East concludes that
the probably outcome of the Big Four talks will be the re
creation of the same conditions and indefensible boundaries
which preceeded the other three wars.

83

Neutralization

could provide the stabilizing influence to avert another
war - one which might include the major powers.

^G-11 Carl Alroy, “Big Four Meddling In The Middle
East". The New Leader. May 12, 19o9» PP* 15-18.
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APPENDIX A
MODEL NEUTRALIZATION TREATY

This is a draft of a model treaty for neutralization
proposed in Black, Neutralization And World Politics,
pages 191-195*

The authors erplaln that modifications

to this treaty would be necessary for any specifio
application.
Actions by neutralized state would b e :
"(1)

It will not enter into any alliance or

collective security agreements, or participate in any
undertaking designed to influence the internal affairs
of other countries.
(2)

It will not permit the use of its territory by

any foreign country for the purpose of establishing
military bases or of engaging in activities designed to
interfere in the internal affairs of other countries;
and will require the withdrawal of such bases and the
cessation of such activities as may e^ist at the time
of this declaration.
(3)

It will not permit the introduction into its

territory of armaments, munitions, and war materials

mo
generally, except such quantities of conventional
^armaments as are necessary for its own internal security
and: defensive purpo se s.
ec _ _ (U)

It will defend its independence and territorial

integrity against interference or attack by any foreign
^country.*

Actions by guarantor states would be :
si e ,f- B (1)

They recognlze and will respect and observe in

-every way the independence, territorial integrity, and
-permanent neutrality of the neutralized state.
r:ercc;(2)

They will not commit or participate in any act

which might directly or indirectly i&pair the permanent
^neutrality of the neutralized state, or resort to the use
;of. force or threat of force or any other measure which
anight impair the peace of the neutralized state.
?r

„:~(3)

They will refrain from all direct or indirect

interference in the internal affairs of the neutralized
state, and. will not attach conditions of a political
nature to any assistance which they may offer or which
the neutralized state may seek.
'.(*0

They will not bring the neutralized state in

any way into any military alliance or other agreement,
whether military or otherwise, which Is inconsistent with
its neutrality, nor invite or encourage it to enter into
any such alliance or to conclude any such agreement.

-141
X5)

They will defend the Independence and terrltorial

Integrity of .the.,neutral! zed state and reserve the right
to come-to its defense separately in the event that Joint
action.cannot, be agreed upon.

~:

They: will respect- the wish of .the,neutralized
atate-not to recognize.the protection of any alliance or
military-coalition*: c:

(7)

c:

They will not introduce into the neutralized

state, foreign troops^or military personnel in any form
whatsoever, nor will they in any way facilitate or condone
the introduction of any foreign troops or military
personnel. ^
(8)

f

ztu b :■i:

They will-not establish nor will they in any

way- facilitate: or connive.at the:establishment:in the ;
neutralized state of any foreign military base, foreign
strong point, or .other foreign-military-installation of-,
any kind..

_

ce =~:

>r-: e

z - -r. (9 ). They-.wi 11 not..use_ the, territory of the neutralized
state: for. interference in the internal affairs of other
countries..
(10)

________

.... r

They will not use the territory of any country,

including their own, for interference in the internal
affairs of the neutralized state.
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Joint actions by the government of guarantor states
and of the neutralized state would be:
®(l)

They appeal to all other states to recognize,

respect, and observe In every way the independence,
territorial Integrity, and permanent neutrality of the
neutralized state and to refrain from any actions in
consistent with these principles or -with other provisions
of the present treaty.
(2)

They will undertake, in the event of violation

or threat of violation of the independence, territorial
integrity, or permanent neutrality of the neutralized
state, to consult Jointly among themselves in order to
consider measures which might prove to be necessary to
ensure the observance of these principles and the other
provisions of the treaty.
(3)

They will establish an International Commission

which shall investigate cases where there may be any
reasonable grounds for considering that a violation of
the provisions of this treaty has occurred.
(4)

They will provide the International Commission

with all the resources and authority necessary for the
effective performance of its duties, including fixed and
mobile inspection teams, in sufficient number, with
adequate access to transportation and communications,
and equipped with the necessary legal documents.
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(5)

They wll-1 recommend

to the other members of

the United Nations, with a view to safeguarding the status
of member states undertaking a policy of permanent
neutrality, that the--'-Charter be revised to the end that
permanently neutralized states:

will not be candidates

JTor membership in the Security Council;

will not be

called upon to participate in- military,- economic, or
.political sanctions against other states;

and will be

permit ted to absent themselves from voting in the General
Assembly on Issues in regard to which an expression of
opinion might at some future time involve them in dis
putes between other countries or groups of countries*
(~6)

They will consult as necessary to review the

proVisions of this/treaty, - on~ the understanding that no
changes will be made in its provisions without the con
currence of the guarantor states and the neutralized
state/
(7)

They will agree to convene a meeting of

representatives-of the guarantor states and the neutralized
state-within six months of receiving a request for such
meeting from any signatory of the treaty.w
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